Oig 24 65 Sep24 Redacted Tsa Ice Report

OIG-24-65 September 30, 2024
FINAL REPORT
CBP, ICE, and TSA Did Not Fully Assess Risks Associated
with Releasing Noncitizens without Identification into
the United States and Allowing Them to Travel on
Domestic Flights (REDACTED)
SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 | www.oig.dhs.gov
September 30, 2024
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable David P. Pekoske

Administrator
Transportation Security Administration
Troy A. Miller
Senior Official Performing the Duties of Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Patrick J. Lechleitner
Senior Official Performing the Duties of Director
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.

Inspector General
SUBJECT: CBP, ICE, and TSA Did Not Fully Assess Risks Associated with
Releasing Noncitizens without Identification into the United States
and Allowing Them to Travel on Domestic Flights – Sensitive
Security Information
Attached for your action is our final report, CBP, ICE, and TSA Did Not Fully Assess Risks
Associated with Releasing Noncitizens without Identification into the United States and Allowing
Them to Travel on Domestic Flights – Sensitive Security Information. We incorporated the formal
comments provided by your office.
The report contains three recommendations aimed at improving CBP’s, ICE’s, and TSA’s ability to
assess risks to public safety of noncitizens released into the United States without identification
and boarding domestic flights. Your office did not concur with the recommendations. Based on
information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider recommendations 1, 2,
and 3 open and unresolved. As prescribed by the Department of Homeland Security Directive
077-01, Follow-Up and Resolutions for the Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations,
within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, please provide our office with a written response
that includes your (1) agreement or disagreement, (2) corrective action plan, and (3) target
completion date for each recommendation. Also, please include responsible parties and any
other supporting documentation necessary to inform us about the current status of the
OIG Project No. 22-044-AUD-DHS

Warning: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be
disclosed to persons without a “need to know,” as defined in 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator
of the Transportation Security Administration. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. Government agencies,
public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520.
recommendations. Until your response is received and evaluated, the recommendations will be
considered open and unresolved.
Please send your response or closure request to OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.
Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will provide copies of our
report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the
Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our website for public
dissemination.
Please contact me with any questions, or your staff may contact Kristen Bernard, Deputy
Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000.
Attachment
Office of Inspector General

U.S. Department of Homeland Security | Washington, DC 20528 | www.oig.dhs.gov
2
DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

CBP, ICE, and TSA Did Not Fully Assess Risks Associated with
Releasing Noncitizens without Identification into the United States
and Allowing Them to Travel on Domestic Flights
September 30, 2024 What We Found

Although U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S.
Why We Did This Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have policies and
procedures to check the identity of noncitizens seeking entry into
Evaluation the United States, they cannot always verify the noncitizens’
identities. According to Federal law, noncitizens without
CBP and ICE are responsible for
identification are not admissible into the country and shall be
verifying the identity of noncitizens
detained. However, CBP and ICE officials are permitted to release
seeking entry into the United
noncitizens into the United States based on various considerations.
States. TSA is responsible for
Prior to releasing these individuals, CBP and ICE immigration officers
screening all individuals intending
accept self-reported biographical information, which they use to
to fly domestically. Our objective
issue various immigration forms. Once in the United States,
was to determine the extent to
noncitizens can travel on domestic flights.
which CBP and ICE have policies
and procedures to confirm an Noncitizens without Transportation Security Administration (TSA)-
individual’s identity for the acceptable identification are allowed to board domestic flights.
documents TSA accepts for Before doing so, TSA requires them to undergo vetting and
domestic travel and whether TSA additional screening. Transportation security officers query law
ensures noncitizens traveling on enforcement and immigration databases to validate the information
domestic flights provide proof of on Department of Homeland Security–issued immigration forms and
identification consistent with all then conduct additional screening procedures such as pat downs.
other domestic travelers. TSA’s vetting and screening procedures do not eliminate the risk
that noncitizens who may pose a threat to fellow passengers could
What We board domestic flights.
Recommend Under current

processes, CBP and ICE cannot ensure they are keeping high-risk
We made three recommendations noncitizens without identification from entering the country.
to assess risks to public safety of Additionally, TSA cannot ensure its vetting and screening procedures
noncitizens released into the prevent high-risk noncitizens who may pose a threat to the flying
United States without identification public from boarding domestic flights.
and boarding domestic flights.
For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at
DHS Response
(202) 981-6000, or email us at: The Department did not concur with our recommendations.
DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. Appendix B contains DHS’ management comments in their entirety.
ww.oig.dhs.gov OIG-24-65
Warning: This record contains Sensitive Security Information that is controlled under 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520. No part of this record may be disclosed to
persons without a “need to know,” as defined in 49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520, except with the written permission of the Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration. Unauthorized release may result in civil penalty or other action. For U.S. Government agencies, public disclosure is governed by 5 U.S.C. 552 and
49 C.F.R. Parts 15 and 1520.

Table of Contents
Background .......................................................................................................................................... 1
Results of Evaluation ........................................................................................................................... 2
CBP and ICE Cannot Always Verify the Identity of Noncitizens without Identification ........ 2
TSA Requires Noncitizens without Acceptable Identification to Undergo Vetting and
Screening Before Traveling on Domestic Flights .................................................................... 6
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 10
Recommendations ............................................................................................................................. 11
Management Comments and OIG Analysis ....................................................................................... 11
Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ............................................................................. 17
DHS OIG’s Access to DHS Information................................................................................... 18
Appendix B: The Department’s Comments on the Draft Report ...................................................... 19
Appendix C: Examples of Databases Checked when CBP and ICE Process Noncitizens into the
United States .......................................................................................................................... 28
Appendix D: Acceptable Forms of Identification at TSA Checkpoints in Airports ........................... 30
Appendix E: Report Distribution ........................................................................................................ 31
Abbreviations
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

C.F.R. Code of Federal Regulations
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
TSA Transportation Security Administration
U.S.C. United States Code
www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-24-65


Background
The Immigration and Nationality Act 1 outlines requirements for the inspection, admissibility,
apprehension, detention, and removal of noncitizens. 2 Within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) are responsible for enforcing immigration laws.
CBP secures the Nation’s borders by preventing inadmissible people and illicit goods from
entering the United States at and between ports of entry. Two offices within CBP process
noncitizens seeking admission into the United States: the Office of Field Operations and the
United States Border Patrol. Office of Field Operations officers process noncitizens who present
themselves at ports of entry, while Border Patrol agents process noncitizens who are
apprehended between ports of entry. When processing noncitizens, Office of Field Operations
officers and Border Patrol agents obtain biographical (such as name and date of birth) and
biometric (such as photographs and fingerprints) information and enter it into DHS databases.
Within ICE, the Enforcement and Removal Operations office also plays a role in processing
noncitizens seeking admission into the United States. 3 Like CBP officers and agents, ICE officers
assess the identities of noncitizens they encounter during their immigration enforcement duties
and record the noncitizens’ biographical and biometric information into a database. 4
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for screening operations at

domestic airports. 5 Every day, TSA screens millions of passengers and their carry-on items at
airports before allowing them to board an aircraft. These passengers may include noncitizens
who may not yet have TSA-acceptable identification but intend to travel on domestic flights.
Our objective was to determine the extent to which CBP and ICE have policies and procedures
to confirm an individual’s identity for the documents TSA accepts for domestic travel and
1
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1101, et seq.
2
The Immigration and Nationality Act uses the term “alien” to describe “any person not a citizen or national of the
United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). According to DHS’ Reporting Terminology and Definitions, August 2023, a
noncitizen is defined as a person who is not a citizen or national of the United States.
3
Although ICE processes noncitizens seeking entry into the United States, the Enforcement and Removal Operations
officers typically encounter noncitizens after they have been previously encountered or detained by CBP or other
law enforcement agencies.
4
Office of Field Operations officers enter the information in the Unified Secondary System, Border Patrol agents
enter the information in the e3 system, and Enforcement and Removal Operations officers enter the information in
the EAGLE system. The information entered in these databases is stored in the Enforcement Integrated Database.
5
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71), November 19, 2001.
www.oig.dhs.gov 1 OIG-24-65


whether TSA ensures noncitizens traveling on domestic flights provide proof of identification
consistent with all other domestic travelers.
Results of Evaluation
CBP and ICE Cannot Always Verify the Identity of Noncitizens without
Identification
According to CBP enforcement statistics, officers encountered more than 3.2 million noncitizens
nationwide in fiscal year 2023, including more than 2.4 million encounters at the Southwest
border. When CBP or ICE immigration officers encounter noncitizens who arrive in the United
States, these individuals are generally considered applicants for admission and are subject to
inspection by immigration officers. 6 Procedures an immigration officer may perform during the
inspection process include:
• review noncitizens’ identification and travel documents, if available;

• obtain noncitizens’ biographical and biometric information and enter it into DHS
databases;
• interview noncitizens;
• collect DNA samples; and
• query law enforcement and immigration databases (examples included in Appendix C)
for derogatory information using the biographical and biometric data obtained. 7
If CBP or ICE immigration officers’ inspections yield derogatory information, depending on the
nature of the information, noncitizens may be (1) deemed inadmissible and refused admission, 8
(2) detained, or (3) released into the United States pending immigration hearings or review of
their admissibility claims by an immigration judge. 9 CBP and ICE immigration officers assign
noncitizens unique Alien Registration Numbers (A-Numbers) as a personal identifier. The
6
See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1), Aliens treated as applicants for admission.
7
In our June 7, 2024 report, DHS Needs to Improve Its Screening and Vetting of Asylum Seekers and Noncitizens
Applying for Admission into the United States (OIG-24-27), we reported that DHS’ biometric system — the Automated
Biometric Identification System — could not access all data from Federal partners to ensure complete screening and
vetting of noncitizens seeking admission into the United States.
8
In FY 2022, CBP officers conducting secondary inspections refused admission to more than 502,000 noncitizens and
arrested more than 15,000 persons wanted for criminal activity.
9
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226, except for noncitizens who cannot be released because they were convicted of certain
crimes such as aggravated felonies, firearms offenses, and crimes of moral turpitude, a noncitizen may be detained
pending a decision on whether the noncitizen is to be removed from the United States.


Figure 1. Office of Field A-numbers are included on various immigration forms,

Operations Officer including Form I-862 – Notice to Appear and Form
Fingerprinting a Noncitizen I-220A – Order of Release on Recognizance. 10 Figure 1 shows
an Office of Field Operations officer obtaining fingerprints
from a noncitizen as part of the intake process.
If noncitizens do not have identification such as an unexpired

visa, 11 unexpired passport, reentry permit, border crossing
identification card, or document of identity and nationality,
immigration officers may deny their admission and subject
them to removal from the United States without further
hearing or review. 12 However, if noncitizens without
identification indicate they either intend to apply for asylum 13
or express a fear of persecution in their home country, an
immigration officer will refer them for a credible fear
Source: Photo taken by DHS OIG
interview. If asylum officers determine those claims are
during a site visit to a port of entry
credible, these noncitizens may be released into the country
in Nogales, AZ, on April 17, 2023
to await further hearings or reviews of their claims to
admission.
CBP and ICE immigration officers can also parole noncitizens into the United States temporarily
for “urgent humanitarian reasons” or “significant public benefit.” 14 Before releasing noncitizens
into the country, CBP and ICE immigration officers issue documents such as Form I-862 and
Form I-220A. If the noncitizens do not have identification, CBP and ICE immigration officers
accept noncitizens’ self-reported biographical information and use this information to populate
10
Form I-862 instructs a noncitizen to appear before an immigration judge. Form I-220A is issued to noncitizens who
have been placed in removal proceedings and also released on their own recognizance. Other examples of
DHS-issued documents containing A-numbers include Form I-220B – Order of Supervision, Form I-94 – Arrival and
Departure Form, and Form I-385 – Alien Booking Record.
11
In our June 25, 2024 report, Management Alert: CBP Has Limited Information to Assess Interview-Waived
Nonimmigrant Visa Holders (OIG-24-33), we reported that CBP port directors at some U.S. ports of entry were
unaware that between 2020 and 2023, the Department of State was granting visas to certain nonimmigrants without
conducting interviews or obtaining fingerprints.
12
See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (Inspection of applicants for admission); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (Documentation
requirements).
13
During FY 2022, the United States received nearly 242,000 applications for asylum.
14
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d), Temporary admissions of non-immigrants. See also Title 8 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (C.F.R.) § 212.5, Parole of aliens into the United States.


the forms. They also collect photographs and Figure 2. ICE Agent Issuing
fingerprints. Additionally, a DNA sample may be Immigration Forms to a Noncitizen
collected from noncitizens over 14 years old. Figure 2
shows an ICE agent issuing immigration forms to a
noncitizen at a processing facility.
CBP and ICE Have Policies and Procedures for

Screening Noncitizens, but Neither Component Knows
How Many Noncitizens without Identification
Documents Are Released into the Country
CBP and ICE immigration officers use guidance outlined

in several publications when screening and inspecting Source: Photo taken by DHS OIG during a
noncitizens (with or without identification). Examples site visit to an ICE processing facility in
of these guidance documents are listed in Table 1 San Diego, CA, on April 20, 2023
below.
Table 1. Examples of Noncitizen Screening Policies and Guidance

Policies and Guidance Description
Provides CBP Office of Field Operations officers guidance
Primary Processing of Travelers
for conducting primary inspections of noncitizens. The
and Vehicles Seeking Entry to the
guidance includes how to validate a noncitizen’s travel
United States at Land Ports of
documents and when to refer noncitizens to secondary
Entry
inspection.*
Provides instructions for conducting queries and
Unified Secondary Training
submitting noncitizens’ biographical and biometric data
Manual
into CBP’s Unified Secondary System.
Mandatory Use of Federated Contains, among other things, reporting requirements for
Person Query 2 and Procedures noncitizens listed in the Terrorist Screening Database.**
for Terrorist Screening Database
Matches
Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Provides guidance for processing noncitizens who have
Have a Credible Fear of credible fear of persecution or torture.
Persecution or Torture


Policies and Guidance Description

Identifies requirements and procedures for using the
Enforcement Integrated Database to support
Enforcement and Removal
identification, arrest, and processing of noncitizens
Encounters
encountered by ICE’s Enforcement and Removal
Operations officers.
Enforcement Integrated Database Provides ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations
Arrest Graphical User Interface for officers instructions for using the database to identify and
Law Enforcement Training Manual monitor noncitizens.
Provides guidance and direction on application of CBP
CBP Directive 3340-043, The
authority in the enforcement of immigration laws
Exercise of Discretionary Authority
nationwide.
Source: Generated by DHS OIG based on reviews of policies and procedures obtained from CBP’s Office of
Field Operations, CBP’s Border Patrol, and ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations
*Secondary inspection occurs if CBP officers find reasons for additional questioning, such as if officers find
derogatory information, the noncitizen’s name appears in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening
Database, or the noncitizen displays suspicious behavior.
**The Terrorist Screening Database is commonly referred to as the Terrorist Watchlist. It includes biographic
identifiers for individuals known or suspected to have ties to terrorism.
As part of our review, we observed CBP officers and agents processing 53 noncitizens at two
ports of entry (Nogales, AZ, and San Ysidro, CA) and four border patrol stations (Chula Vista, CA;
Imperial Beach, CA; Nogales, AZ; and Yuma, AZ) in April 2023. During our visits, we watched
immigration officers review travel documents (when available), obtain photographs and
fingerprints, collect DNA samples, and interview noncitizens. We also observed officers and
agents entering noncitizens’ biographic and biometric information into the Unified Secondary
System and e3 databases. We noted that 7 of the 53 noncitizens (13 percent) did not have
identification.
We requested data on the number of noncitizens who did not have identification and were
released into the United States from FYs 2021 through 2023. Because immigration officers are
not required to document whether a noncitizen presented identification in the databases, the
data we obtained may be incomplete. Therefore, neither CBP nor ICE could determine how
many of the millions of noncitizens seeking entry in the United States each year entered without
identification and whose self-reported biographic information was accepted. CBP and ICE


immigration officers we interviewed acknowledged the risks of allowing noncitizens without

identification into the country, yet neither CBP nor ICE conducted a comprehensive risk
assessment for these noncitizens to assess the level of risk these individuals present and
developed corresponding mitigation measures.
TSA Requires Noncitizens without Acceptable Identification to Undergo Vetting

and Screening Before Traveling on Domestic Flights
TSA requires that passengers provide a TSA-acceptable form of identification before boarding
an aircraft in the United States. Forms of acceptable identification include a government-issued
driver’s license, passport, military ID, work permit, and residence card, among other IDs.
Appendix D provides examples of identification TSA accepts for travelers.
Individuals who do not have acceptable identification may still fly if TSA can validate their
identities through other means. According to TSA’s Checkpoint and Specialized Screening
Standard Operating Procedures, 15 for individuals without acceptable identification,
transportation security officers 16 must:
• inspect two other forms of identification, one of which must have the individual’s name
and other information such as photo, address, phone number, social security number, or
date of birth;
• obtain the individual’s name, address, signature, and date from the TSA Form 415 –
Certification of Identity completed by the individual; and
• contact TSA’s National Transportation Vetting Center 17 to validate the individual’s
identity using the information recorded on TSA Form 415.
Once in the United States, noncitizens processed by DHS can travel on domestic flights.
According to TSA’s Checkpoint Acceptance of Specific Documents for Non-Citizens or Non-U.S.
Nationals directive, 18 if noncitizens do not have acceptable identification, TSA will use
15
TSA’s Checkpoint and Specialized Screening Standard Operating Procedures, Version 2, June 13, 2022.
16
An individual who is trained, certified, and authorized by TSA to inspect individuals, carry-on items, and/or
checked baggage for explosives, incendiaries, weapons, or other threat items.
17
The National Transportation Vetting Center is part of TSA’s Intelligence and Analysis office. Transportation
security officers at airports call the center and request a document validation.
18
TSA Operations Directive OD-400-50-1-31C, Checkpoint Acceptance of Specific Documents for Non-Citizens or Non-
U.S. Nationals, March 18, 2022.


DHS-issued documents to initiate procedures to validate

“that the individual presenting the document is the same individual previously processed by
DHS.” Per the guidance, transportation security officers initiate these procedures by either
using the CBP OneTM mobile application or contacting the National Transportation Vetting
Center. 19
• When using the CBP OneTM application, the transportation security officer takes a
photograph of the individual through the mobile application. The CBP OneTM application
attempts to match the photograph to the biographic and biometric information DHS
previously captured and entered when processing the noncitizen for entry into the
United States. If a match is found, CBP OneTM returns a photograph of the noncitizen and
a green check mark with the first name, last name, date of birth, and A-number of the
traveler. If the application cannot confirm a match, CBP OneTM returns a red “X.” Figure
3 shows examples of results returned from CBP OneTM.
Figure 3. Examples of CBP OneTM Query Results
Source: TSA
•
information from the noncitizen’s DHS-
issued immigration forms to the call center’s representative for validation. The
19
As of April 2024, 229 airports across the country were using CBP OneTM.


representative then queries CBP OneTM 20 using the information obtained from the
transportation security officer.
If the National Transportation Vetting Center or the transportation security officer’s CBP OneTM
query confirms a match, the transportation security officer must then conduct further screening
using Advanced Imaging Technology and Explosive Trace Detection, or pat downs, before
allowing the noncitizen to enter the airport’s sterile area (an area of the airport that provides
access for boarding aircraft) and eventually board an aircraft. A noncitizen whose identity
cannot be validated must be denied entry to the airport’s sterile area.
In March 2024, TSA updated its Checkpoint and Specialized Screening Standard Operating
Procedures, 21 Checkpoint Acceptance of Specific Documents for Non-Citizens or Non-U.S.
Nationals, 22 and the CBP OneTM Standard Operating Procedures. 23 TSA’s updates resulted in the
following procedural changes:
• When CBP OneTM is available, all transportation security

officers must use the application and a photo must be Because of CBP’s and ICE’s
taken when attempting to establish a noncitizen’s process for inspecting and
identity. If an individual does not permit their releasing noncitizens, TSA’s
photograph to be taken or if the photo does not match methods to screen for
the photo captured by DHS, they must be denied entry individuals who pose a threat
into the screening checkpoint. would not necessarily prevent
• The CBP OneTM query would indicate if the noncitizen these individuals from
presented a passport during previous DHS encounters. If boarding flights.
the query indicates that a passport was presented, TSA
will request that the individual produce the passport. If
the passport is presented and authenticated, the individual will proceed with the screening
process consistent with the vetting status indicated on their boarding pass.
20
Beginning on March 11, 2024, TSA required the National Transportation Vetting Center to use CBP OneTM as the
primary database to attempt to validate a noncitizen’s information (National Transportation Vetting Center Bulletin
22-01a, CBP OneTM App, March 13, 2024). However, alternate CBP databases may be used when warranted to
validate the noncitizen’s information.
21
TSA’s Checkpoint and Specialized Screening Standard Operating Procedures, Version 6, March 29, 2024.
22
TSA Operations Directive OD-400-50-1-31E, Checkpoint Identification Processing for Non-U.S. Citizens or Non-U.S.
Nationals, March 11, 2024.
23
TSA’s CBP OneTM Standard Operating Procedures, March 11, 2024.


Because of CBP’s and ICE’s process for inspecting and releasing noncitizens, TSA’s methods to
screen for individuals who pose a threat would not necessarily prevent these individuals from
boarding flights.
According to the TSA Administrator, TSA relies on CBP and ICE

officers to collect biographical and biometric information on noncitizens and conduct the
requisite background checks to determine if the individual poses a threat to the United States. 24
TSA’s Requirements and Capabilities Analysis office previously conducted an assessment that
emphasized the risk of noncitizens whose identity cannot be confirmed. Specifically, in a June
2021 analysis of the risks associated with using CBP OneTM as a screening tool, TSA’s Operational
Risk and Case Studies group, within the Requirements and Capabilities Analysis office,
concluded that:
24
Letter from TSA Administrator David P. Pekoske to Representative Lance Gooden, January 7, 2022.


Additionally, TSA provided us with an updated CBP OneTM risk assessment marked “pre-
decisional,” dated July 5, 2024. This document is signed and final according to TSA.
In recent reports, we documented similar weaknesses in CBP’s screening processes that allowed
high-risk individuals into the country. For example, one noncitizen released into the United
States in 2022 was later found to appear on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist
Watchlist. 25 We also identified at least two persons paroled into the United States as part of
Operation Allies Refuge/Operation Allies Welcome that may have posed a threat to national
security and the safety of local communities. 26 Finally, in June 2024, we reported that DHS’
biometrics system, the Automated Biometric Identification System, could not access all data
from Federal partners to ensure complete screening and vetting of noncitizens seeking
admission into the United States. 27 Specifically, we determined that CBP could not access all
biometric data held in the Department of Defense’s Automated Biometric Identification System,
which contains the Department of Defense’s Biometrically Enabled Watchlist.
Conclusion
CBP, ICE, and TSA have developed and implemented
25
CBP Released a Migrant on a Terrorist Watchlist, and ICE Faced Information Sharing Challenges Planning and
Conducting the Arrest (REDACTED), OIG-23-31, June 28, 2023.
26
DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis
(REDACTED), OIG-22-64, September 6, 2022.
27
DHS Needs to Improve Its Screening and Vetting of Asylum Seekers and Noncitizens Applying for Admission into
the United States (REDACTED), OIG-24-27, June 7, 2024.


policies and procedures to screen noncitizens. However, their efforts
If CBP and ICE continue to allow

noncitizens — whose identities immigration officers cannot confirm — to enter the country, they
may inadvertently increase national security risks.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the
Commissioner of CBP conduct a comprehensive analysis of the risks associated with releasing
noncitizens into the country without identification and develop and implement policies and
procedures to mitigate those risks.
Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Director of ICE conduct a comprehensive analysis

of the risks associated with releasing noncitizens without identification from ICE custody and
develop and implement policies and procedures to mitigate those risks.
Recommendation 3: We recommend that the TSA Administrator use the results of the
Requirements and Capabilities Analysis office’s updated CBP OneTM risk assessment to develop
and implement policy and procedural changes needed to mitigate risks
Management Comments and OIG Analysis

The Department provided management comments to a draft of this report. The comments are
provided, in their entirety, in Appendix B. The Department also provided technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate. The Department did not concur with the
recommendations we offered. A summary of the management comments and our response
follows.
In its response, the Department acknowledged that we accurately reported that CBP and ICE
have policies and procedures to check the identities of noncitizens seeking entry into the United
States, and that before allowing noncitizens without identification to board domestic flights,
TSA requires them to undergo vetting and additional screening. However, the Department
expressed concerns about the analysis and conclusions presented in the report. For example,


the Department cited that although it continues to remove record numbers of noncitizens, it
cannot categorically detain all individuals subject to detention, including those inadmissible
noncitizens without identification documents, due to several reasons including a lack of
resources (e.g., bed space). ICE officials stated that their currently funded detention capacity of
approximately 41,500 beds does not allow them to detain every noncitizen without proper and
valid identification documents. CBP officials added that their facilities are intended for “short-
term” detention, and they cannot legally hold noncitizens longer than the law allows, even to
mitigate potential risks associated with releasing noncitizens without identification documents.
Lastly, TSA officials stated that the statements and conclusions in the report do not reflect
current policies and procedures and that the report did not integrate and emphasize
substantive information TSA provided.
We recognize the challenges the Department faces, including the lack of resources and
restrictions outlined in legislation governing the detention and admission process.
Nevertheless, according to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A), Inspection of applicants for admission, and 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7), Documentation requirements, noncitizens without identification documents
are not admissible into the country and immigration officers may deny their admission and
subject them to removal from the United States without further hearing or review. (Our report
notes exceptions such as claims of asylum.) The point we make in the report is that CBP and ICE
cannot always verify some noncitizens’ identities when they make decisions regarding whether
to release the noncitizens into the country. The lack of assurance creates a potential risk.
Conducting a comprehensive assessment would allow the Department to determine, for
example, the size and scope of the issue and the level of risk. We noted in the report that neither
CBP nor ICE could determine how many of the millions of noncitizens seeking entry in the
United States each year entered without identification. We explained in the report that this is
because immigration officers are not required to document whether a noncitizen presented
identification when they process the noncitizen. To understand the breadth of an issue, having
reliable data should be a priority, and data could be obtained through a comprehensive
assessment.
With respect to TSA’s comments, we acknowledge that TSA’s policies and procedures for vetting
noncitizens have changed since the beginning of this evaluation, and we noted the significant
changes in our report. However, TSA implemented some of these changes near the end of our
evaluation, so we also described policies and procedures in effect for most of our scope period.
We acknowledge that TSA conducts further screening and vetting of all passengers — citizens
and noncitizens — who do not have identification documents before allowing them to fly.
Because the report focuses on noncitizens, we did not emphasize the process for screening and


vetting citizens. Further, we recognize that with its updated policies and procedures, TSA
requires all transportation security officers to take a photo of a noncitizen without identification
and to use CBP One TM if available, in addition to the noncitizen’s , to
establish a noncitizen’s identity. We describe this process in our report. Finally, TSA officials
stated that although our report accurately described concerns of operational risk identified in a
July 5, 2024, risk assessment, we did not include the risk analysis’ conclusion that use of CBP
One TM will decrease the operational risk of an imposter using documents issued by CBP to
another person to gain access to an aircraft. We noted this conclusion on page 9. Moreover, we
also noted that although the use of CBP One TM will confirm whether the noncitizen at the
screening checkpoint is the same individual who CBP or ICE previously encountered, it does not
mean that
We recognize the complexity of the issue and appreciate the challenges facing the Department.
Although the recommendations are addressed to each component (ICE, CBP, and TSA), the
intent of our recommendations is for the Department to develop a unified strategy for
addressing the issue. Although we understand that each component carries out its unique
mission, we believe that a whole-of-Department approach will be most effective.
Department Response to Recommendation 1: Non-concur. Although CBP acknowledges the

broad intent of the recommendation, mitigating potential risks associated with releasing
noncitizens into the country without identification requires broadly detaining noncitizens,
including those noncitizens lacking documentation, for a time exceeding “short-term”
detention as defined in 6 U.S.C. § 211(m)(3). As previously discussed, CBP cannot hold
noncitizens for a time exceeding “short-term” detention. Once noncitizens clear initial record
checks and vetting, officers process them for the appropriate immigration processing pathway,
including transfer to ICE custody for a custodial determination or possible release from CBP
custody. Further, detaining all individuals without identification would seriously risk DHS
exceeding its detention capacity, and may hamper DHS’ ability to prioritize detention for
individuals identified as a possible national security or public safety risk.
OIG Analysis: We recognize CBP’s concerns that detaining all individuals without identification
would exceed DHS’ detention capacity and hamper its ability to prioritize detention for those
individuals identified as a possible national security or public safety risk. We agree that without
confirmation of a noncitizen’s identity, the Department faces challenges in identifying
noncitizens who pose a national security or public safety risk. As we reported, noncitizens


without identification
Because of the potential risks CBP cited, we maintain CBP should conduct a comprehensive
analysis to consider the risks associated with these challenges and develop and implement
policies and procedures to help mitigate those risks. For example, the detention limitations in 6
U.S.C. § 211(m)(3), does not preclude CBP from working with ICE and other stakeholders to
assess potential risks and identify solutions to mitigate those risks. This recommendation is
open and unresolved until CBP analyzes the risks and develops mitigation strategies.
Department Response to Recommendation 2: Non-concur. ICE already comprehensively

analyzes the risks associated with releasing noncitizens without identification from ICE custody.
As previously noted, prior to a noncitizen’s release from ICE custody, ICE individually assesses
the individual’s danger to the community or threat to national security. A lack of identification
documents is only one of many factors considered by ICE law enforcement when releasing a
noncitizen from custody. ICE uses a module, the Risk Classification Assessment, to standardize
the custody decision-making process in all of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations field
offices.
The Risk Classification Assessment results in a recommendation/decision for ICE to detain or

release a noncitizen in custody. If ICE detains an individual, the module will also recommend a
custody classification level. If released, the individual will receive a community supervision
level recommendation/decision. Additionally, if eligible, the system recommends an initial
bond amount. An ICE supervisor must approve all risk classification assessment-recorded
recommendation/decisions. Further, ICE law enforcement may use risk classification
assessments as either a primary assessment performed during initial intake, or as a secondary
assessment officers can perform at any time during custody to make release decisions. A
subsequent assessment and re-determination of the detain/release and custody
classification/community supervision level decisions may be triggered by detention standard
procedures, disciplinary infractions, availability of new case information, or violations of
conditions of release.
The module’s methodology for making recommendations/decisions is based upon a framework

developed by ICE to consider factors that inform the custodial decision-making process. These
factors include special vulnerabilities, mandatory detention, risk of harm to public safety, and
risk of flight. Agents and officers throughout DHS use most of the factors addressed by the risk
classification assessment module during the intake process to make custody decisions. The


methodology is based on current industry standard risk assessment techniques and is intended
to optimize public safety.
OIG Analysis: We fully acknowledge that ICE uses the risk classification assessment to make
decisions on whether to detain or release a noncitizen and that the lack of identification
documents is one of many factors ICE considers in its decision-making process. We recently
conducted an audit of ICE risk classification assessment process, 28 and reported that ICE did not
consistently follow this process to prevent the release of high-risk individuals into the country.
Specifically, we concluded ICE officers did not always perform risk classification assessments to
ensure they appropriately detained or released noncitizens held in ICE custody, and ICE officials
did not always provide detailed justifications when deviating from the risk classification
assessment’s recommendation to detain noncitizens. ICE concurred with our two
recommendations to improve its oversight of the risk classification assessment process.
Until ICE strengthens the risk classification assessment process, it cannot ensure its officers are
making informed, consistent, and transparent custody decisions that prevent release of
noncitizens who pose a potential risk to public safety. Moreover, conducting a comprehensive
analysis associated with risks of releasing noncitizens without identification could result in ICE
re-evaluating the importance of considering identification documents in the risk classification
assessment. This recommendation is open and unresolved until ICE conducts a comprehensive
analysis of the risks associated with releasing noncitizens without identification from its
custody.
Department Response to Recommendation 3: Non-concur. TSA mitigates the risks associated

with allowing noncitizens without acceptable forms of identification to travel and will continue
to do so as a part of its mission. As part of TSA’s continuous review of its processes, TSA
conducted a risk assessment earlier this year concerning allowing low identity-assurance
passengers to fly, which was briefed to TSA leadership on July 1, 2024, before approval. This
risk assessment was sent to the OIG on July 5, 2024. This assessment includes a tiered structure
of supplementary physical screening measures (above standard screening) that can be used, if
warranted, by the threat status or conditions at the airport. During the July 1, 2024, meeting,
TSA leadership also reviewed the current threat and operational situation and—using the tiered
framework—determined that the current additional physical screening was appropriate.
28
ICE Risk Classification Assessment Process Was Not Consistently Used to Prevent the Release of High-Risk
Individuals, OIG-24-31, June 12, 2024.


TSA will continue to monitor the threat and operational situation. If the threat or operational
situation changes, TSA will review its screening procedures for low identity-assurance
passengers based on the tiered framework and will make changes as appropriate.
OIG Analysis: We acknowledge that TSA provided us with its updated CBP One Risk Assessment
at the conclusion of this audit, dated July 5, 2024, which included a tiered approach for physical
screening of non-citizens whose identity has not been established with adequate confidence. As
noted in our report, these individuals
In its response to this recommendation, TSA asserts that
its leadership reviewed the current threat and operational situation and determined that
continuing to apply additional screening was appropriate. However, TSA did not provide us
with evidence of this review and its conclusions to determine that additional screening was
sufficient, and that policy and procedural changes were not needed to mitigate risks. This
recommendation is open and unresolved until TSA provides evidence supporting its conclusion
that additional screening of noncitizens without identification is sufficient to reduce the security
risk these individuals pose to an acceptable level.


Appendix A:
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was established by the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107−296) by amendment to the Inspector General
Act of 1978.
We conducted this evaluation to determine the extent to which CBP and ICE have policies and
procedures to confirm an individual’s identity for the documents TSA accepts for domestic
travel and whether TSA ensures noncitizens traveling on domestic flights provide proof of
identification consistent with all other domestic travelers.
To answer our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed applicable Federal laws and regulations as
well as TSA, CBP, and ICE policies, procedures, training documents, and information technology
system manuals. CBP’s Office of Field Operations and Border Patrol officers and agents also
provided us demonstrations of their information technology systems. In addition to analyzing
documents and observing systems, we interviewed component officials in Washington, DC, and
other locations.
We obtained CBP OneTM and TSA’s WebEOC system query data, which we used to select airports
along the Southwest border at which to interview field personnel. We interviewed Federal
Security Directors and Supervisory Transportation Security Officers from these locations based
on the highest number of CBP OneTM and National Transportation Vetting Center queries
conducted by TSA. We did not conduct data reliability testing on this information because we
did not rely on these sources to develop our findings.
We conducted in-person and telephonic interviews with personnel in the field including:
• TSA’s Federal Security Directors and Supervisory Transportation Security Officers

representing six airports (Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Phoenix Sky Harbor
International Airport, George Bush Intercontinental Airport, San Diego International
Airport, San Angelo Regional Airport, and San Antonio International Airport);
• CBP’s Office of Field Operations personnel representing six ports of entry (Nogales, AZ;
San Luis, AZ; Calexico, CA; San Ysidro, CA; El Paso, TX; and Hidalgo, TX);
• CBP’s Border Patrol personnel representing six border patrol stations (Nogales, AZ;
Yuma, AZ; Chula Vista, CA; Imperial Beach, CA; Del Rio, TX; and McAllen, TX); and


• ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations personnel representing five field offices
(Phoenix, AZ; Yuma, AZ; San Diego, CA; El Paso, TX; and Harlingen, TX).
To observe how CBP and ICE processed noncitizens, we conducted site visits at three land ports
of entry (Nogales, AZ; San Luis, AZ; and San Ysidro, CA) and four border patrol stations (Chula
Vista, CA; Imperial Beach, CA; Nogales, AZ; and Yuma, AZ). We also visited an ICE facility in San
Diego, CA, where we observed agents search the Enforcement Integrated Database using a
noncitizen’s biographic and biometric information to check for derogatory information.
We conducted this evaluation between June 2022 and May 2024 under the authority of the
Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 401-424, and according to the Quality Standards for
Inspections and Evaluations issued by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency.
DHS OIG’s Access to DHS Information

During this evaluation, DHS provided timely responses to DHS OIG’s requests for information
and did not delay or deny access to information we requested.


Appendix B:
The Department’s Comments on the Draft Report


















Appendix C:
Examples of Databases Checked when CBP and ICE Process Noncitizens into the
United States
Intake Database Purpose

Visa Waiver Program travelers must apply for and receive an
Electronic System for Travel approved travel authorization via the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization Authorization to board an aircraft or vessel bound for the United
States.
The database maintains information related to the investigation,
Enforcement Integrated arrest, booking, detention, and removal of persons encountered
Database during immigration and criminal law enforcement investigations and
operations conducted by DHS components.
ICE officers use this module to support the arrest, detention,
Enforce Alien Removal Module
processing, and removal of aliens from the United States.
Arrival and Departure The system consolidates data from a variety of systems to create a
Information System person’s complete travel history.
Travelers visiting the United States can apply for or retrieve Form I-
I-94 Official Website
94, request their travel history, and check travel compliance.
The Automated Biometric Identification System is the central DHS-
Automated Biometric
wide system for storing and processing biometric and associated
Identification System
biographical information for national security purposes.
The Central Index System is a repository of electronic data that
Central Index System contains basic data related to an individual passing through the
immigration process.
The Person Centric Query Services allows United States Citizenship
Person Centric Query Service and Immigration Services officers to query transactions involving a
noncitizen across several connected systems.
TECS TECS is the principal information-sharing system and data repository
used by officers at the border to assist with screening and noncitizen
admissibility determinations. It contains operational records
relevant to the anti-terrorism and law enforcement mission of CBP
and numerous other Federal agencies.


Intake Database Purpose

The Center is an information system containing documented criminal
National Crime Information justice information such as names and other descriptive data. It
Center contains a variety of files consisting of records that participating
criminal justice and authorized noncriminal justice agencies
contribute.
Automated Targeting System – CBP uses this tool to improve the collection, use, analysis, and
Land dissemination of information gathered to target, identify, and
prevent potential terrorists from entering the United States.
Source: DHS OIG analysis of various public U.S. governmental law enforcement and immigration
system documentation


Appendix D:
Acceptable Forms of Identification at TSA Checkpoints in Airports
• Driver’s license or other photo identity card issued by a state Department of Motor
Vehicles (or equivalent)
• State-issued enhanced driver’s license
• U.S. passport
• U.S. passport card
• DHS trusted traveler cards
• U.S. Department of Defense ID, including those issued to dependents
• Permanent resident card
• Border crossing card
• Acceptable photo ID issued by a federally recognized Tribal Nation/Indian Tribe
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 personal identification card
• Foreign government-issued passport
• Canadian provincial driver’s license or Indian and Northern Affairs Canada card
• Transportation worker identification credential
• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Employment Authorization Card (Form I-766)
• U.S. Merchant Mariner Credential
• Veteran Health Identification Card
Source: DHS OIG analysis of TSA’s Checkpoint and Specialized Screening Standard Operating Procedures,
Version 6, April 29, 2024, and TSA’s website, https://www.tsa.gov/security-screening/identification


Appendix E:
Report Distribution
Department of Homeland Security
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
TSA Liaison
CBP Liaison
ICE Liaison
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch

DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees

Additional Information
To view this and any other DHS OIG reports, Please visit our website: www.oig.dhs.gov
For further information or questions, please contact the DHS OIG Office of Public Affairs via email:
DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov
DHS OIG Hotline

To report fraud, waste, abuse, or criminal misconduct involving U.S. Department of Homeland
Security programs, personnel, and funds, please visit: www.oig.dhs.gov/hotline
If you cannot access our website, please contact the hotline by phone or mail:
Call: 1-800-323-8603
U.S. Mail:
Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive SW
Washington, DC 20528-0305

Oig 24 65 Sep24 Redacted Tsa Ice Report

Uploaded by

Document Informationclick to expand document informationDHS OIG Report confirming Biden-Harris admin allows released migrants without ID to board airlines.

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Copyright:

Available Formats

Oig 24 65 Sep24 Redacted Tsa Ice Report

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Oig 24 65 Sep24 Redacted Tsa Ice Report

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

OIG-24-65 September 30, 2024

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

September 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable David P. Pekoske

FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

Please send your response or closure request to OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov.

Office of Inspector General

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

September 30, 2024 What We Found

Recommend Under current

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for screening operations at

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

• review noncitizens’ identification and travel documents, if available;

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Figure 1. Office of Field A-numbers are included on various immigration forms,

If noncitizens do not have identification such as an unexpired

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

CBP and ICE Have Policies and Procedures for

CBP and ICE immigration officers use guidance outlined

Table 1. Examples of Noncitizen Screening Policies and Guidance

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Policies and Guidance Description

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

immigration officers we interviewed acknowledged the risks of allowing noncitizens without

TSA Requires Noncitizens without Acceptable Identification to Undergo Vetting

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

DHS-issued documents to initiate procedures to validate

Figure 3. Examples of CBP OneTM Query Results

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

• When CBP OneTM is available, all transportation security

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

According to the TSA Administrator, TSA relies on CBP and ICE

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

CBP, ICE, and TSA have developed and implemented

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

policies and procedures to screen noncitizens. However, their efforts

If CBP and ICE continue to allow

Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Director of ICE conduct a comprehensive analysis

Management Comments and OIG Analysis

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL