1. Introduction

1.1. Procedure and fact-finding

1.2. Issues at stake

6. It should be pointed out that the Assembly and our committee have on several occasions looked at issues relating to the co-existence of different religions in a democratic society and at the compatibility of certain religious attitudes with the Convention. In particular, in November 2011 the Assembly adopted Resolution 1846 (2011) and Recommendation 1987 (2011) on combating all forms of discrimination based on religion, on the basis of the report by Mr Tudor Panţiru (Romania, SOC), who had looked in detail at the concept of “reasonable accommodation”, the principle of State neutrality vis-à-vis religions and the fight against discrimination. Moreover, in September 2015, the Assembly adopted Resolution 2076 (2015) on this subject – “Freedom of religion and living together in a democratic society”.

2. Analysis of the relevant instruments and their legal force

2.1. Sharia law

8. Sharia law is understood as being “the path to be followed”, that is, the “law” to be obeyed by every Muslim (Surah 5). It divides all human action into five categories – what is obligatory, recommended, neutral, disapproved of and prohibited – and takes two forms: a legal ruling (hukm), designed to organise society and deal with everyday situations, and the fatwa, a legal opinion intended to cover a special situation. Sharia law is therefore meant in essence to be positive law enforceable on Muslims. Accordingly, it can be defined as “the sacred Law of Islam”, that is, “an all-embracing body of religious duties, the totality of Allah’s commands that regulate the life of every Muslim in all its aspects”.

2.1.1. Legal nature

9. While most States with Muslim majorities have inserted a provision referring to Islam or Islamic law in their Constitutions, the effect of these provisions is symbolic or confined to family law. Admittedly, these religious provisions may have a legal effect if raised in the courts and a political effect if they intrude into institutional attitudes and practices. However, the authority of Sharia law is derived directly from the Qur’an, and traditional Islamic law contains no effective provisions concerning its position in the pyramid of norms.

2.1.2. Sharia law: problematic rules in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights

12. In respect of divorce, under Islamic law, a husband has a unilateral right to divorce (talaq), although this can be delegated to the wife, if included in the nikah (marriage contract), and a wife can therefore exercise her right to divorce (talaq e tafwid) without the husband’s consent. Otherwise, a wife may initiate the divorce process, but only with the consent of the husband, by seeking a khula. In this case the wife forgoes her dowry (mahr). In cases where the husband has deserted the wife, has failed to co-operate with the divorce process or is acting unreasonably, the marriage may be dissolved (faskh), but only by a qadi or a Sharia ruling. Hence, while divorce by mutual consent is enshrined in Islamic law (Surah 2:229 and Surah 4:128), the application must come from the wife, since the husband can repudiate his wife at any time. There is also the question of equal rights regarding divorce arrangements such as custody of children.

13. For division of an estate among the heirs, distinctions are made according to the sex of the heir. A male heir has a double share, whereas a female heir has a single share. In addition, the rights of a surviving wife are half those of a surviving husband (Surah 4:12).

2.1.3. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam

18. However, the Cairo Declaration has given rise to much controversy, for example concerning the concept of equality, the right to marry and the notable failure to recognise freedom of belief. Article 5(a) of the Cairo Declaration lays down the right to marry as follows: “Men and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race, colour or nationality shall prevent them from enjoying this right.” According to experts, the reason why religion is not mentioned here is because Sharia law does not recognise a woman’s right to marry a non-Muslim. The declaration further holds that “Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature” (Article 10). Article 1 of the 1990 Cairo Declaration recognises that “[a]ll men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other considerations”. This suggests that equality is to be understood in terms of dignity, obligations and responsibilities but not in terms of law. To put it plainly, Muslim women and non-Muslims have the same obligations and responsibilities as Muslim men but not the same rights (just the same “dignity). Last but not least, the Cairo Declaration is based solely on the rights and freedoms of Sharia law (Article 24: “All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah”), which is considered “the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration” (Article 25).

19. In 2011 the OIC set up the Independent Permanent Human Rights Commission (IPHRC) as an expert body with an advisory capacity and one of the principle human rights bodies of the OIC. The OIC has adopted a number of declarations and conventions, including the Declaration on the Rights and Care of the Child in Islam (1994), the OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism (1999), the Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam (2005) and the Statute of the OIC Women’s Development Organisation (2009).

2.2. Legal force of the Cairo Declaration

21. In legal terms, these are political declarations, representing a position taken by a number of States with regard to human rights in Islam. However, in public international law, these declarations are not legally binding, since they are merely “declaratory”. A declaration is a legal instrument which is not a treaty, constituting a position taken by a State on a situation, demand or action, which may contribute to the development of a peremptory norm. Moreover, a State can enter reservations when acceding to an international organisation, as in the case of Turkey when it joined the OIC. In practice, this limits the effects of the 1990 Cairo Declaration to compliance with the Turkish Constitution.

3. Council of Europe member States that are signatories to one or more Islamic legal instruments

4. Sharia law seen through the prism of the European Convention on Human Rights

26. The Islamic declarations on human rights adopted since the 1980s are imperfect attempts to reconcile Islam with human rights in the universal sense. They are often more religious than legal texts. The preamble to the Cairo Declaration, for example, states that fundamental rights are an integral part of the “Islamic religion” and refers directly to Sharia law as a source of reference for interpreting them. We often find provisions which can prove to be disguised limitations on the rights being proclaimed, reflected in references to States’ domestic legislation, to Sharia law or to rather vague definitions of the rights being guaranteed. There are also serious omissions, particularly regarding freedom of religion, since Article 10 of the Cairo Declaration makes no reference to freedom of belief or freedom to manifest one’s religion, stating only that “it is prohibited to exercise any form of compulsion on man … in order to convert him to another religion or to atheism”. The 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights leaves in abeyance fundamental issues such as gender equality and freedom of religion and discriminates between Muslims and non-Muslims with regard to freedom of movement in the “Islamic world”.

27. The European Court of Human Rights had the opportunity to rule on the incompatibility of Sharia law with human rights in its 2001 and 2003 judgments in the Refah Partisi v. Turkey case, holding that: “Turkey, like any other Contracting Party, may legitimately prevent the application within its jurisdiction of private-law rules of religious inspiration prejudicial to public order and the values of democracy for Convention purposes (such as rules permitting discrimination based on the gender of the parties concerned, as in polygamy and privileges for the male sex in matters of divorce and succession).”

28. In this particular case, the decision by the Turkish Constitutional Court to order the dissolution of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), which advocated the introduction of Sharia law, was held to be compatible with the Convention, and the Court clearly affirmed the following: “It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts.” With respect to Sharia law itself, the Court expressly stated that “a political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing Sharia in a State Party to the Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the Convention” (paragraph 123). The Court reasserted these principles in the Kasymakhunov and Saybatalov v. Russia case.

29. The Court has ruled that Sharia law is incompatible with the Convention, but obviously this does not mean that there is absolute incompatibility between the Convention and Islam, since the Court has recognised that religion is “one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life”. Accordingly, the Court’s relatively firm position should not be taken as a rejection of all elements of Sharia or of Islam as a whole, whilst taking into account the existence of structural incompatibilities between Islam and the Convention which, as far as Sharia law is concerned, are sometimes absolute and sometimes relative.

5. Application of Sharia law on all or part of the territory of a Council of Europe member State – case studies

5.1. Western Thrace in Greece – legal application of the Sharia law through muftis

32. In the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923, Greece and Turkey agreed to a compulsory population exchange. The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, signed in Lausanne on 30 January 1923, expressly excluded the “Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace” and the “Greek inhabitants of Constantinople” from this population transfer. The Greek State recognises the existence of only one minority on Greek territory, namely the “Muslim” minority of Western Thrace in north-eastern Greece. The Treaty of Lausanne applies only to Greek Muslims in Western Thrace, not to Muslims in other parts of Greece or to new Muslim immigrants. There is also a Greek Muslim community on the Dodecanese Islands. Greek civil law, not Sharia law, applies to this community. There are currently between 80 000 and 120 000 Muslims in Thrace. The Muslim minority comprises three ethnic groups including 50% Turkish, 35% Pomak and 15% Roma.

33. The Treaty of Lausanne stipulates that Turkey allows its non-Muslim minority to decide questions of “family law or personal status” according to “the customs of those minorities” (Article 42) and confers reciprocal rights “on the Moslem minority” in Western Thrace (Article 45). The Treaty specifies only that the States adopt measures that allow their minority populations to resolve issues about personal status according to their religious beliefs; nowhere does it mention establishing religious courts. Greece, however, has interpreted the Treaty to mean that muftis act as judges in religious courts for private law issues. The muftis’ role was codified in two domestic Greek laws (Act 147/1914 and Act 1920/1991), which allow Greek Muslims in Western Thrace to choose Sharia law as a parallel legal system for specific areas of private law.

34. Since 1990, there have been five muftis in Thrace: three appointed by the Greek State and two elected by the minority population but not recognised by the Greek authorities. The official muftis act in both religious and judicial capacities. They are in charge of the mosques, cemeteries and religious foundations, and are responsible for the imams in their districts. They also have jurisdiction over prescribed areas of private law, including cases of divorce, alimony, custody, pensions and the emancipation of minors. They do not have jurisdiction over issues related to adoption, children born out of wedlock, the division of property upon divorce or communication with children. Because muftis are civil servants and act as judges, the Greek State maintains it has the right to appoint them. This has given rise to disputes (muftis elected by the minority but not recognised by the public authorities have been prosecuted for illegal use of religious symbols) and has led the European Court of Human Rights to find violations of Article 9 of the Convention. It appears that the Greek authorities tolerate this dual mufti system.

35. A number of experts and international bodies have noted an extension of the muftis’ authority and application of Sharia law to Greek Muslims living outside Western Thrace and even outside Greece (in Australia, under Ruling No. 12/2001 of the Komotini Religious Court; in the United Kingdom, under Ruling No. 146/2002 of the Xanthi Religious Court). It has also been noted that muftis have expanded their jurisdiction to cover some marriages between Greek Muslims and partners who are not members of the Muslim community in Thrace.

36. Although muftis act in a judicial capacity, these proceedings often lack procedural safeguards. Muftis are not trained as judges, yet have the power to make decisions that greatly impact individuals’ lives.

37. Because representation by attorneys is not required in proceedings before muftis, parties often lack legal representation. This lack of representation puts women at a distinct disadvantage. Females in the Muslim community in Western Thrace are often not well educated – some are illiterate – and do not always know their legal rights in either the religious or civil sphere. Furthermore, male litigants have legally stronger positions than female litigants in the proceedings.

38. There is also a lack of further judicial review of muftis’ decisions. Such decisions are final and cannot be appealed. Muftis’ written decisions are often perfunctory, with just a short description of the facts and a judgment; the reasoning or legal basis for the decision is generally absent. Although muftis’ decisions only become legally binding once ratified by a Greek Court of First Instance, in actual practice Greek courts provide a mere façade of review, ratifying 99% of the decisions they receive. This occurs even though Greek courts must review whether the decision falls within the mufti’s jurisdiction, and under Law No. 1920/1991 domestic courts shall not enforce decisions contrary to the Greek Constitution. However, courts rarely judge if decisions comply with the Constitution, even those that infringe on women and children’s rights and violate the Convention.

39. There have also been reports of underage marriage and marriage by proxy. According to Hanafi law, a person must have reached puberty – generally the age of 15 – before marrying. However, girls under the age of 15 may marry with parental consent. In 2005, the mufti presided over the marriage of an 11-year-old Muslim girl. Because the Greek Civil Code has no prescribed minimum age for marriage and instead allows the judge or mufti to decide if minors may marry, such marriages are legal under Greek civil law. Muftis have also officiated at a number of Muslim weddings by proxy without the express consent of the brides, who are sometimes underage. Until at least 2003 such marriages were even recorded in the State public records. The local muftis state that they have not conducted any marriages by proxy since 2006.

40. Women are at a distinct disadvantage in divorce and inheritance proceedings, two key areas over which muftis have jurisdiction. Under Sharia law as practised in Thrace, there are a number of ways to obtain a divorce. The most common form is by mutual consent. In such cases, the woman essentially “buys” herself out of the marriage, either by returning her dowry, waiving her right to alimony, or giving up custody of her children. Alternatively, men may unilaterally state that they would like a divorce. In Thrace, such statements must be made to the mufti and the husband must compensate his wife. In contrast, without the consent of her husband, a woman may only initiate a divorce if the husband is at fault. However, in such cases the mufti can reject the application, as has happened in numerous instances.

41. In theory, every Muslim citizen in Thrace can choose freely between Sharia and civil law for decisions concerning family and inheritance law. However, the Greek Supreme Court has a narrow interpretation of this right to choose. In its Judgment No. 1097/2007 of 16 May 2007, the Greek Supreme Court held that for Greek Muslims, inheritance of unencumbered property was strictly governed by “Islamic holy law”, not by the Greek Civil Code. Under “Islamic holy law” it is not possible to inherit through a will. The coexistence of this parallel legal system has been much criticised.

42. Thomas Hammarberg, former Commissioner for Human Rights, clearly stated that he was “favourably positioned towards the withdrawal of the judicial competence from muftis, given the serious, aforementioned issues of compatibility of this practice with international and European human rights standards”. At the same time, he emphasised that it is important to ensure the direct participation of the minority group in this process, as it touches directly on minority rights.

43. In March 2014, Chatitze Molla Sali, a Muslim woman from Western Thrace, filed an application against Greece with the European Court of Human Rights. Molla Sali challenged the Greek Supreme Court’s ruling of 7 October 2013 that the will of a deceased Muslim citizen in favour of his wife was invalid on the grounds that it was against Sharia law. According to this ruling, matters of inheritance involving members of the Muslim minority had to be settled by the mufti, as required by Sharia law. Prior to his death, Molla Sali’s husband had written a notarised will leaving her his estate. After her husband’s death, her sisters-in-law brought suit, claiming that because the deceased belonged to the Thrace Muslim community, Sharia law – in which wills are invalid – applies. The Greek courts initially dismissed the case, both at first instance and on appeal. However, the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment, holding that questions of inheritance fall under the muftis’ jurisdiction. The case was remitted to a new Court of Appeals bench, which found that because Sharia law applied, the will was not valid. On 7 June 2017, the case was relinquished to the Court’s Grand Chamber; a hearing was held in December 2017.

5.2. Sharia councils in the United Kingdom

45. There is currently no single accepted definition of the term “Sharia council”. In the United Kingdom, these bodies generally provide advice and attempt to resolve disputes relating to family or personal issues, according to the principles of Sharia law. However, little is known about their work, which is conducted in private, and decisions are not published, leading to a lack of transparency and accountability. The actual number of Sharia Councils operating in the United Kingdom is also uncertain. However, a study by the University of Reading identified 30 groups involved in this type of activity (although later concluded that some smaller councils closely associated with mosques had not been included), whilst a report by the think tank Civitas estimated that at least 85 groups are operating, although this figure also includes informal tribunals run out of mosques or online forums.

46. Sharia councils provide a form of alternative dispute resolution, whereby members of the Muslim community voluntarily consent to accept their religious jurisdiction. Whilst marital issues and granting Islamic marriage divorces accounts for around 90% of the work undertaken by Sharia councils, they also advise in matters of law including issues of inheritance, probate and wills and Islamic commercial law contracts, and provide mediation, counselling and fatwa (religious ruling) services.

47. Sharia councils are not considered part of the British legal system. They are not courts and their decisions are not legally binding. As pointed out in the recently published independent review into the application of sharia law in England and Wales (Independent Review), “It is important to note that sharia councils are not courts and they should not refer to their members as judges”. Studies have found that councils seek to avoid conflict with civil law. However, despite having no judicial authority, some councils see themselves as authoritative on religious issues, and “the power of Sharia councils lies in how they are perceived by their communities”.

49. The above-mentioned Independent Review describes as one of its key findings the fact that “a significant number of Muslim couples fail to civilly register their religious marriages and therefore some Muslim women have no option of obtaining a civil divorce”. Some women may have no other option but to obtain a religious divorce by way of a faskh, for which the judgment of a Sharia council is required. Furthermore, even in cases where women have a civil law marriage, some may seek the decision of a Sharia council, for reasons of self-identity or community standing, to provide reassurance that they have the religious freedom to remarry within their faith. “Those who obtain a civil divorce but not a religious divorce may find it difficult to remarry. This position is sometimes referred to as a ‘limping marriage’”. One of the experts invited before the committee, Ms Zee, denounced what she described as “marital captivity”.

50. There are numerous reports citing examples of how Muslim women have been discriminated against by Sharia councils. Examples of such discrimination include women being pressured into mediation, including for victims of domestic abuse; greater weight being given to the husband’s accounts of reasons for divorce; women not being questioned by council members, who are almost all men, in an impartial manner and feeling blamed for the breakdown of the marriage; marital rape not being recognised as rape; and unjustified requirements to repay the mahr (dowry). There have also been allegations made that Sharia councils have issued discriminatory rulings with regard to child custody; the Casey Review cited claims that “some Sharia councils have been supporting the values of extremists, condoning wife-beating, ignoring marital rape and allowing forced marriage”; and researchers were told that “some women were unaware of their legal rights to leave violent husbands and were being pressurised to return to abusive partners or attend reconciliation sessions with their husbands despite legal injunctions in place to protect them from violence.” However, the majority of the evidence is anecdotal, as very little empirical evidence has been gathered in relation to users of Sharia councils; further research in this area is therefore necessary. Mechanisms are required to provide safeguards and ensure that vulnerable women are not exploited or put at risk. Many of these women are also not aware of their rights to seek redress before the British courts.

51. Sharia councils should not be confused with arbitration tribunals. The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) was established in 2007 under the Arbitration Act 1996. The MAT operates within the framework of British law and its decisions can be enforced by civil courts, provided that decisions have been reached in accordance with the legal principles of the British system. The legal authority of the MAT comes from the agreement of both parties to give the tribunal power to rule on their case. In cases where decisions do not conform to the principles of British law, they may be quashed. Moreover, the 1996 Act cannot be used to exclude the jurisdiction of the family law courts. The MAT can therefore conduct arbitration according to Islamic personal law on issues such as commercial and inheritance disputes.

52. Two official inquiries are currently considering the issues surrounding the application of Sharia law in the United Kingdom. The Commons Home Affairs Select Committee Inquiry into Sharia Councils, launched in June 2016, heard evidence from numerous parties concerned, but was terminated due to the general election in June 2017. As mentioned above, in May 2016, the Home Office launched an Independent Review into the Application of Sharia Law in England and Wales.

54. Baroness Cox’s Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill [HL] 2016-2017, first introduced to the House of Lords as a Private Members’ Bill in 2011, received a second reading in the House of Lords on 27 January 2017. The Bill aims to protect women from religiously sanctioned gender discrimination and address a “rapidly developing alternative quasi-legal system which undermines the fundamental principle of one law for all”. At its second reading, the government contended that there are aspects of the Bill which are legislatively unnecessary because of existing legislation, as well as issues which should be considered in light of the above-mentioned Independent Review.

5.3. The French territory of Mayotte (until 2011)

56. Until Mayotte was made a département in 2011, the inhabitants had two types of status: personal status (local civil law) and ordinary civil status. Personal status was governed by customary law modelled on Islamic law and African and Madagascan customs. This special system of civil law applied automatically to Muslim citizens of Mayotte, who nevertheless had the option of waiving it in favour of ordinary civil status.

57. However, this personal status was incompatible with the principles of the French Republic and possibly in contradiction with the European Convention on Human Rights. Polygamy was permitted, a woman could be repudiated by her husband, and discrimination against women in matters of inheritance remained. From 2000 onwards, an acceleration of the process of making Mayotte a département led the French Parliament to undertake a radical transformation of local civil status to bring it into line with the principles of the French Republic and closer to ordinary civil status.

58. The transformation of Mayotte into a département also marked the end of qadi justice, with the introduction of a judicial system based on ordinary law and a reorganisation of the courts. It should be noted that qadi justice had been heavily criticised by the population of Mayotte, who rejected the application of some principles of customary law (including repudiation, polygamy and men’s double share of inheritances) and the random nature of qadi justice, which failed to respect the principle of a fair hearing. Mayotte society’s strong attachment to France, combined with the lengthy process of turning Mayotte into a département, allowed an overhaul of local civil status and an end to qadi justice in favour of a judicial system based on ordinary law.

5.4. Russian Federation

59. The Russian Federation, which has been a member of the Council of Europe since 1996and an observer at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation since 2005, is a patchwork of ethnic and religious groups. Islam is considered to be the country’s second religion, covering, in 2010, some 14.3 million Muslims belonging to over 40 different ethnic groups, the largest of which are the Tatars, Bashkirs and Chechens. Most Russian Muslims live in the Northern Caucasus, particularly in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Tatarstan. Russia’s Muslims also have their own organisations.

60. In the Northern Caucasus, and particularly Chechnya, family and property matters are usually judged under Sharia law, while disputes arising out of violence, abduction, insults and adultery come under orally transmitted customary law (“adat”). Here, under the guise of “tradition”, women and girls are victims of violence and discriminatory practices such as early marriage, abduction for forced marriage, “honour” killings, female genital mutilation and polygamy, despite the provisions of Russian federal law. Moreover, family relations are governed by the idea that children are the “property” of the father, so that women lose all custody and access rights for their children after a divorce. The recent report by our former committee colleague Michael McNamara (Ireland, SOC) notes that “[t]he deterioration of the situation of women in the Chechen Republic through the rigid enforcement of religious norms has continued”. I trust that our colleague Frank Schwabe will also look further into this aspect in preparing his report on “The continuing need to restore human rights and the rule of law in the North Caucasus region”.

61. In the Chechen Republic, the authorities continue to interfere in citizens’ private and social lives with their imposition of Islamic values. For example, the leaders of the Chechen Republic require women to dress according to Islamic rules and tolerate violent attacks on women whose dress is considered indecent. Such actions are clearly in breach of the rights enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 11 of the Constitution of the Chechen Republic. A number of cases are currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights.

5.5. Turkey

63. Sharia law does not apply in Turkey, even though most of the population obeys the precepts and rituals of Islam. It would appear that action by the AKP government has had the effect of weakening the principle of secularism rather than abolishing it. However, the ban on the Islamic headscarf was lifted first in State universities, then in the civil service and subsequently in secondary schools. Furthermore, religious education is now compulsory in schools, which is problematic for religious minorities, whether Muslim or non-Muslim.

6. Conclusions

I thank the rapporteur for his report, based on my motion for a resolution.

The rapporteur clearly notes the total incompatibility of shari'ah Law with the European Convention on Human Rights. He finds Sharia law incompatible with the Convention on the following points and I concur with him:

• Article 2 (right to life)
• Article 3 (prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment)
• Article 6 (right to a fair trial)
• Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life)
• Article 9 (freedom of religion)
• Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination on grounds such as sex or religion)
• And furthermore:
• Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property) 
• Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (equality between marital partners.)
• Protocols Nos. 6 and 13 (prohibition of the death penalty)

I do not consider this list to be exhaustive. For instance, blasphemy laws based on sharia, like the ones in Pakistan, are clearly not compatible with article 10 (freedom of expression).

In Articles 24 and 25 the Cairo Declaration states that: 

The Islamic shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration.”

The European Court of Human Rights in the Refah Partisi v. Turkey case ruled: 

The Cairo Declaration is just a declaration and is clearly not compatible with the legally binding Convention. Therefore you cannot sign and ratify the Convention and be a signatory to the Cairo Declaration. The States that are in this situation should be asked to withdraw from the Cairo Declaration in order to fulfil their obligations under the Convention. 

Sharia councils in the United Kingdom perpetuate the problem of marital captivity. Whereas under civil laws men and women enjoy equal rights to divorce, Sharia councils maintain a system where women have limited rights as compared to men.

Other family law issues are also highly problematic in Sharia. Men and women do not get equal shares from a heritage. And the husband gets the custody of older children in case of a divorce. This is clearly totally incompatible with the Convention and States should refrain from granting legitimacy to Sharia councils. Instead member States should enforce their own civil laws, which exist to protect the weaker party. Particularly women who feel great social pressure should be helped through civil courts to enforce their rights.