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Manhattan DA Defers To Judge Merchan

Manhattan DA defers to Judge Merchan in Trump NYC case

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
368 views2 pages

Manhattan DA Defers To Judge Merchan

Manhattan DA defers to Judge Merchan in Trump NYC case

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jackp
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
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DISTRICT ATTORNEY

COUNTY OF NEW YORK


ONE HOGAN PLACE
New York, N. Y. 10013
(212) 335-9000 RECEIVED
CENTRAL CLERK'S OFFICE

AUG 1 9 2024
ALVIN L. BRAGG, JR.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
SUPREME COURT
CRIMINAL TERM
August 16, 2024 NEW YORK COUNTY
Hon. Juan M. Merchan
New York State Supreme Court, Criminal Term, Part 59
100 Centre Street
New York, New York 10013
Dear Justice Merchan:
This letter addresses defendant's August 14, 2024 letter requesting an adjournment of the
sentencing date. The People defer to the Court on the appropriate post-trial schedule that allows
for adequate time to adjudicate defendant's CPL § 330.30 motion while also pronouncing sentence
"without unreasonable delay." CPL § 380.30(1). To assist the Court, we note the following points.
Defendant's letter indicates for the first time his intent to seek interlocutory state or federal
appellate review, before he is sentenced, of any adverse ruling on his CPL § 330.30 motion. It is
correct that the denial of immunity from prosecution is immediately appealable. But here, in
contrast to defendant's criminal case in D.C., the question of defendant's immunity from
prosecution is not presented; the only question now before the Court is whether a small subset of
the trial evidence was improperly admitted in light of a brand-new evidentiary rule that derives
from official-acts immunity, and if so, whether any error in admitting official-acts evidence was
harmless.' The Supreme Court's recent decision did not consider whether a trial court's ruling on
that distinct evidentiary question is immediately appealable, and there are strong reasons why it
should not be. Nonetheless, given the defense's newly-stated position, we defer to the Court on
whether an adjournment is warranted to allow for orderly appellate litigation of that question, or
to reduce the risk of a disruptive stay from an appellate court pending consideration of that
question.2 The People are prepared to appear for sentencing on any future date the Court sets.
The People are also mindful that significant public safety and logistical steps by multiple
agencies are necessary to prepare for court appearances in this matter. The defendant's newly-

As the People noted in our opposition to the defendant's pending immunity motion, "the evidence
that he claims is affected by the Supreme Court's ruling constitutes only a sliver of the mountains
of testimony and documentary proof that the jury considered in finding him guilty of all 34 felony
charges beyond a reasonable doubt." People's Mem. 1.
2 Assuming that defendant seeks an interim stay of the sentencing hearing immediately after this
Court's September 16 ruling, the People respectfully note that an appellate court considering such
a request will understand that, without an interim stay, it would have to receive briefing and decide
certain issues of first impression in one day.
stated position concerning an immediate appeal of the Court's CPL § 330.30 ruling may mean that
significant preparatory steps are taken, only to have such steps disturbed by appellate litigation.
None of defendant's remaining arguments merit any consideration. First, although couched
as a scheduling request, defendant re-raises for the fourth time a recusal grievance based on false
claims of a potential conflict that have already been rejected over and over by this Court, the First
Department, and the Advisory Committee. Defendant's ostensibly new argument about the Court's
family member's co-worker's tweets is bizarre and has nothing to do with the post-trial schedule.
Defendant's concern about a "public sentencing submission" from the People is also
misplaced. Any pre-sentence memorandum the People submit would be sealed. CPL § 390.50(1).
The only way the memorandum would become public is if the Court orders otherwise or the
defendant unlawfully discloses it.

Finally, defendant's apparent insinuation that state prosecutors are incapable of applying
federal constitutional law is fundamentally flawed, given that the People and this Court protect
and apply federal constitutional rights every day.
Based on the foregoing, the People respectfully defer to the Court on the appropriate post-
trial schedule.
Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Matthew Colangelo


Matthew Colangelo
Christopher Conroy
Susan Hoffinger
Becky Mangold
Joshua Steinglass
Assistant District Attorneys

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