UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

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SUHAIL NAJIM ABDULLAH . Civil Action No. 1:08cv827

AL SHIMARI, et al.,

.

Plaintiffs,

vs. . Alexandria, Virginia

CACI PREMIER TECHNOLOGY, INC.,. September 10, 2021 10:10 a.m.

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Defendant.

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CACI PREMIER TECHNOLOGY, INC.,.

Third-Party Plaintiff,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and .
JOHN DOES 1-60, .

. Third-Party Defendants. .

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TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEONIE M. BRINKEMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS: PETER A. NELSON, ESQ.

Patterson Belknap Webb &

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1133 Avenue of the Americas

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and

BAHER AZMY, ESQ.

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(APPEARANCES CONT'D. ON PAGE 2)

(Pages 1 - 33)

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES

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know, were there to be any kind of an offer from the defense,

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    you would be obligated to take that back to your client.
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               MR. AZMY: We fully understand, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right.
               MR. AZMY: And our understanding is -- well, there
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    has been no offer --
               THE COURT: All right.
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               MR. AZMY: -- but we, of course, would consider
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     anything seriously.
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               THE COURT: All right. Mr. O'Connor, I'm going to
     put you back on the hot seat, if you don't mind standing up
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     there. I mean, I'm not going to make anybody, you know,
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     negotiate in open court, but, you know, I really, really want
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     to strongly recommend and suggest that you give some thought.
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               Your client -- I know your client is a large
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     corporation and has significant resources, so it may not be of
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     concern to your client that it's continuing to pay attorneys'
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     fees, you know, for litigation that most likely is going to go
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     on for a couple of years no matter what happens. I mean, were
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     I to grant your motion to dismiss, we know the plaintiffs will
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     take an appeal. I would be shocked if they didn't.
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               The Fourth Circuit would look at it. It could
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     possibly go back up to the Supreme Court. That's another year
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     or two, a lot more litigation that goes on.
               Were I to not grant your motion to dismiss and if
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     this case proceeds, then the meter will run even more
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least that you're open, all right? And frankly, I have always

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Anneliese J. Thomson OCR-USDC/EDVA (703)299-8595

thought the counsel in this case have been superb. Reading the briefs was absolutely fascinating.

It is really a pleasure as a judge to get really well-reasoned -- I might not agree with all the arguments, but, I mean, well-argued, well-reasoned, articulate arguments, and there are obviously some really significant issues that both sides are raising in this litigation, but I'm a bit of a pragmatist, and I come down to the reality of I'm looking at a case that was first filed in 2008, and as you know, I was only -- I've only been on this case a few years. Many of the earlier decisions were out of my control, and the case might have been in a different posture if I had it from 2008, but it's been up and down at the Fourth Circuit multiple times, it's been to the Supreme Court, and it's still very amorphous. There are still from the status reports that you've filed all kinds of issues that are not yet resolved.

One thing that may help in terms of significantly getting a settlement potential moving is in the status report -- and the plaintiffs did not respond to this, which concerned me somewhat -- the defendants point out that the requests through the discovery process were made for a clear statement of what the damages are that the plaintiffs -- for which the plaintiffs are suing, and according to my understanding of the status report, the plaintiffs have never responded to that.

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You know, in an ordinary civil case, if a party in a
case which is calling for damages, if the defendant in such a
case files a discovery request to the plaintiffs, you know,
list your damages and give us, you know, what you are seeking
in this case, and that's not responded to, that can result in
Rule 37 sanctions.
          So I want the plaintiff to respond to that aspect of
the status report. Where are you with that? Because my
understanding was you represented that in the expert reports --
          MR. O'CONNOR: In response to initial disclosure
requirements and our interrogatories, the plaintiffs said that
they would detail their damages in their expert reports, which
the expert reports did not put a dollar figure or a method of
calculation for any damages. So we're -- if we went to trial,
I'd hear it in closing argument, you know, what plaintiffs
believe they've been injured.
          THE COURT: All right. But the other thing is you've
requested the opportunity to have your own medical experts
examine the plaintiffs.
          MR. O'CONNOR: For two of the three. One, one we
were able to do --
          THE COURT: Right.
          MR. O'CONNOR: -- because she was able to come to
this country; that's right, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: But the other two have not been examined.

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               MR. O'CONNOR: They've not, and the options appear to
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     be Iraq -- at least a few years ago, the options were Iraq,
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     Iran --
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               THE COURT: Beirut, I thought, was one.
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               MR. O'CONNOR: That might have been. It certainly
     was a place where they might be able to testify, but they were
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    places that, you know, are probably not the most hospitable for
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     a government contractor.
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               THE COURT: All right. So again, I mean, these are
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     realities of this case. Again, this is putting aside for a
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     moment the pending motion to dismiss, but in terms of, you
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     know, a settlement evaluation, this is something the plaintiffs
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     have to look at very, very carefully.
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               So let me hear -- let me have you switch positions
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     for a second.
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               MR. O'CONNOR: Can I say one more thing --
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               THE COURT: Yes, sir.
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               MR. O'CONNOR: -- that bears on our manner of
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     thinking?
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               Your Honor has mentioned this before. We do have
     another case that's been stayed for about ten years assigned to
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     Your Honor that has about 60-ish plaintiffs.
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               THE COURT: I keep forgetting that.
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               MR. O'CONNOR: That, that always -- I mean, that is
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     something that always weighs on our mind too because it's not
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     where in a different posture, it might be that you settle these
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     three cases and you're done. That's not the case here.
     mean, I don't have any idea whether the plaintiffs' counsel
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     there are even in touch with those plaintiffs, but we have
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     another case pending before Your Honor with about 60
    plaintiffs.
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               THE COURT: Were there to be a genuine settlement
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     effort, you'd want a global settlement.
               MR. O'CONNOR: I, I don't know that that's true, Your
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     Honor. What I would say is that this is not a case where my
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     client could reach a settlement with three people and be done.
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     We'd either have to litigate with the others or try to reach a
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     settlement with the others, but, you know, our view has been
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     that, you know, there's a lot of principles involved here.
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               THE COURT: I understand that, all right. All right.
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               What -- yeah, come up to the lectern, please.
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     your name again, please?
               MR. NELSON: Peter Nelson, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Nelson. What is the status of
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     the -- one plaintiff, as I understand it, is in Sweden.
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               MR. NELSON: That's correct.
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               THE COURT: What is the actual status of your other
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     two plaintiffs? Have you been able to contact them?
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               MR. NELSON: Yes. Actually a member of our team was
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     in touch with them today. They, they both are in Iraq.
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THE COURT: All right. Are they able to travel 1 2 outside of Iraq? 3 MR. NELSON: I, I don't know the answer to that. 4 we certainly would undertake efforts to do that. I think the 5 COVID pandemic makes travel particularly difficult, and the circumstances in Iraq are somewhat unstable, but they are 6 7 willing to make the effort and certainly would make themselves 8 available within Iraq to -- for, for a video examination or 9 testimony. 10 THE COURT: All right. Okay. 11 MR. NELSON: And, and just to respond on the damages 12 issue, all three of our plaintiffs were deposed and described 13 their injuries. We also submitted an expert report from a 14 doctor that described the injuries. We haven't quantified, we 15 haven't offered a number. 16 If that's something the Court believes that we should 17 do or are obligated to do before trial, we could take that 18 under advisement. 19 THE COURT: Well, it certainly helps a defendant in 20 evaluating the strengths and weaknesses not -- of the case but 21 also of, you know, whether or not settlement efforts make any 22 sense, but I just want -- you know, I spoke briefly with Judge 23 Anderson. He is certainly open and willing to work with you if 24 there's a serious interest in settling. 25 Mr. O'Connor, when I said "global," it's been my

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experience when I have a party who is facing two -- multiple
pieces of litigation, that many times the settlements that work
the best would be global; that is, you bring the other, other
case in as well. We could talk about that down the road if, in
fact, you know, there is any genuine interest in trying to
settle.
          But I'm glad you reminded me, I've totally forgotten
about the other case because this one has always been the lead
case, but we'll need to take a look at that, and just I'll give
you an alert that most likely I'm going to issue a status
report on that one, try to get that -- see where they are on
that one, because I'm assuming many of the same legal arguments
that are before the Court now apply to that case as well.
          It's all at Abu Ghraib; is that correct?
          MR. O'CONNOR: The other case, I believe -- we
haven't had any discovery in that case, but I believe it is not
strictly limited to Abu Ghraib, but I -- but it's limited to
persons who were detained by the U.S. military in Iraq.
          THE COURT: Is it ATS only?
          MR. O'CONNOR: That one is ATS only from the start.
Clear statute of limitations issues with common law, so they
only brought ATS.
          THE COURT: All right, all right. We'll take a look
at that when we go back to chambers, all right?
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All right, so the -- and there was one other thing I

- 1 want to just clear up. You know, anytime a motion is filed,
- 2 | the Clerk's Office puts a gavel on it until it is resolved, and
- 3 | this case has gavels -- you-all don't see them, but we do, it's
- 4 | a way of keeping track of what's going on -- there are just
- 5 gavels all over the place.
- 6 So when I looked at the status report particularly,
- 7 because the defendants went through a whole bunch of issues
- 8 that still need to be resolved, and the plaintiffs really
- 9 | didn't respond to that, but I notice that one of the motions
- 10 | that's out there, one of the issues that's out there, so I
- 11 | thought I could get rid of a couple of gavels at least, is I'm
- 12 not issuing a juror questionnaire in this case if we get to
- 13 that point.
- 14 Juror questionnaires are expensive. They're
- 15 time-consuming. I, I only give them in capital or national
- 16 | security cases. That's not what this is, and I'm satisfied
- 17 | that the standard way we do voir dire will be more than
- 18 | sufficient. So I'm going to deny that motion. That's one
- 19 | gavel I can get rid of.
- 20 All right. In terms of the motion to dismiss, I'm
- 21 | not going to rule on it today, which doesn't help you a whole
- 22 | lot. I have looked at the arguments. I'll give you,
- 23 Mr. O'Connor, an opportunity to focus the argument, but I gotta
- 24 | tell you that I think you overread Nestlé, all right? And
- 25 that's the only basis really for your argument.

I mean, we've resolved the motions to dismiss in the past. You know, we have found that *Kiobel* and *Jesner*, none of those cases truncate this case.

And I don't see *Nestlé* having changed the law significantly. In fact, *Nestlé* explicitly says at the beginning it's clarifying *Kiobel*. It does not overrule *Kiobel*. So why don't you try to convince me that I misunderstand that situation.

MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, Your Honor, thank you. We've never said, at least I don't think, that Nestlé overruled Kiobel. Our point is that some courts, including the Fourth Circuit, had read the stray language at the end of the Kiobel majority opinion, the touch and concern language, as providing for you can consider anything at all relating to the claim and sort of make a holistic assessment on whether, you know, the claim has enough domestic content to allow the case to proceed as a domestic application of ATS.

We've always thought that was not the correct reading of Kiobel. Kiobel is a case that cites to Morrison, and the rule in Morrison is the two-step focus test, and as the Supreme Court pointed out in Nabisco, the reason that in Kiobel the Court did not go through and apply Step 1, Step 2 of the, the focus test was because all of the conduct occurred extraterritorially, so the Court said we don't, we don't need to get into it. That's how Nestlé cast it.

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But when we were last before Your Honor, Your Honor's view was that Al Shimari III was law of the case and that the things like status as a U.S. corporation, entering into U.S. contracts, hiring U.S. employees, getting U.S. security clearances, that those were the kinds of things that could supply the domestic content for an ATS claim. And when we went up to the Fourth Circuit, we've put in the transcript from the Fourth Circuit argument, and the panel certainly was of the view that RJR Nabisco was the law here and, and not Al Shimari III. That's why the panel was asking for JA cites of actual conduct in the United States that's relevant to the claims, to the ATS -- alleged ATS violations. And Nestlé punctuates that because Nestlé says all of the things that are alleged in Nestlé, they don't count. They're not adequate --THE COURT: I think you -- they're characterized as general corporate activity, right? MR. O'CONNOR: That's, that's right. And, and it's things like, well, all operational decisions are made in the United States. Not good enough. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants have taken steps to perpetuate a system built on child slavery to depress labor costs. Not good enough. Even if true, not good enough.

General corporate activity in the United States.

THE COURT: All right. Let's say, for example, however, that a corporation which had its employees functioning in a foreign country got an e-mail from one of their employees saying this -- you know, the project is, is violating international law, there are colleagues who are out there torturing people. That memo is sent back to headquarters, and the corporation does nothing to address that.

You don't think that is sufficient activity that

MR. O'CONNOR: I don't think it would, Your Honor, because in Nestlé, the allegation that was credited, because that was a facial challenge, so the allegation that was credited was that Nestlé and Cargill knew, they knew that the entities that they were doing business with were using child slavery and they were paying kickbacks for the purpose of keeping cocoa prices low, and the Court said that's not enough.

would affect -- that would give the jurisdiction under the ATS?

Now, I'll also -- I want to add that in -- under Aziz, the Fourth Circuit has held that knowledge is not even aiding and abetting. So if a corporation had acted with the purpose and saying we want to do this conduct in this foreign country because we want to commit -- we want to commit child slavery, we want to commit torture, we want to commit piracy, you know, whatever, whatever ATS claim we're talking about here, then I think that conduct is relevant.

The Supreme Court talked about is there enough

- domestic conduct? So I think there would have to be some assessment of whether is this enough compared to what's occurring extraterritorially?
- THE COURT: But then doesn't that make a motion to dismiss of the type you've made really a motion for summary judgment because it is so evidentiary in nature?
- MR. O'CONNOR: It doesn't, Your Honor, because this is, this is a jurisdictional motion, and on a fact-based jurisdictional motion, the Court's obligation is to resolve any facts, but we've -- there are no real facts in dispute here. I mean, plaintiffs can say that, but it -- but it's not true.
- The plaintiffs -- and this is the domestic conduct that the plaintiffs talked about: incorporated in the U.S., contracted in the U.S., hired U.S. citizens with U.S. security clearances. Under Nestlé, plainly general corporate activity. There's nothing nefarious about any of those things.

Then they say that CACI promoted an employee after learning he was accused of detainee abuse. That is not supported by the record. They -- what they cite to is the 30(b)(6) of CACI, and what that witness testified to was that in March, a CACI executive was told that a CACI employee was under investigation, no name, no under investigation for what. Just that somebody's being investigated.

And then ten days later, at the -- either at the government's request or with the government's approval, CACI

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filled the, filled the vacancy as site lead at Abu Ghraib
Prison with Steve Stefanowicz, who later when the Taguba report
was leaked, he was -- allegations were made against him in the
Taquba report.
          But even Mr. Morse's testimony in the 30(b)(6) makes
clear CACI didn't have any reason to believe that
Mr. Stefanowicz was under investigation when he was made the
site lead. So that's not -- there's no record basis for that.
          THE COURT: But has Rich Arant been deposed in this
case?
         MR. O'CONNOR: He has not, Your Honor, but --
          THE COURT: Because that October 14, 2003, e-mail
that he sent to Amy Jensen, in my view, would be a smoking gun
in almost any piece of litigation. He, he resigned after
having been over there for a very short period of time, and he
flagged -- now, it is true he didn't say that CACI had done
anything wrong. I mean, he was very diplomatic, but he did say
he was resigning because of the misconduct that he was seeing
at Abu Ghraib.
          I'm amazed that nobody at CACI would have wanted to
follow up on that type of a memo. Is there -- discovery is
over. Was there evidence -- did anybody probe the Arant
e-mail? Did anybody speak with him and find out exactly what
it was about Abu Ghraib that was troubling him?
          MR. O'CONNOR: I believe the answer to that is no,
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Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. O'CONNOR: And certainly no at the time of the e-mail. This e-mail was sent to Amy Monahan, who is -- who was deposed in this case. She viewed the e-mail as talking about issues that were specific to the Army, and, in fact, that's what they are.

I wouldn't even say that the author of this e-mail is diplomatic about CACI. I think he's clear that the folks at CACI hadn't done anything wrong, and the only misconduct he identifies is male soldiers interrogating a female soldier, which he also says is being investigated by the Army.

So we could sit here today with the benefit of hindsight and say should Ms. Monahan have gone to the Army and said, you know, we have somebody who thinks that having junior soldiers as interrogators is a bad idea and you ought to take a look at that? We, we could do that with 20-20 hindsight, but that's not involvement by CACI in torture, in war crimes, or in cruel, inhumane, or whatever the "D" stands -- degrading conduct.

That is somebody saying, I don't like the way that soldiers are doing interrogations, but CACI people are clean as a whistle here.

Again, could she/should she have said something to somebody at the Army? We can debate that, but, but that does

not make CACI liable because knowledge, of course, is not good enough under Aziz.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. O'CONNOR: But, you know, we're not saying that that was handled perfectly, but I don't think that's what we need in order to show that this is not a domestic application of CACI, that one -- and I'm glad Your Honor brought up that e-mail because as we go through, that's the only thing in plaintiffs' brief that's not general corporate activity that has any actual record basis.

You know, the other conduct that plaintiffs -- the other supposed whistleblower event that plaintiffs talk about occurred entirely in Iraq. That was Torin Nelson speaking to Scott Northrop, and even Torin Nelson said he didn't, in his words, have anything damning on the CACI people. He was just concerned for his personal safety because the prison was being bombed, and he was concerned that he was, maybe rightly, viewed dimly by some of his coworkers for comments he made to C.I.D., which he admits he had no factual basis for.

THE COURT: Well, in your reply brief, the way you characterize Nestlé, you say that Nestlé unequivocally holds that the ATS applies, quote, only when the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the U.S.

MR. O'CONNOR: Yes, Your Honor. I think, I think that's exactly what Nestlé holds.

THE COURT: So do you think that the only way in which an American corporation can be held liable for torture or violation of -- other violations of jus cogens overseas occurs if the conduct itself occurs in the United States? It almost seems to be, you know, a contradiction.

MR. O'CONNOR: Well, Your Honor, I don't -- I think the answer to your question is no, but I want to define "conduct." If a corporation conspires from the United States to commit child slavery, piracy, torture, then I believe that that -- I think a court would be on reasonably firm ground to say that there's a domestic application.

Now, the defendants in Nestlé said the, the primary conduct has to occur in the United States. We've not argued that. We've argued that the ATS violation has to occur in the United States, but there's no evidence of CACI personnel in the United States agreeing with anyone to mistreat detainees. They were walled off from that. The Army ran that and --

THE COURT: Well, of course, I mean, under traditional principles of agency, if an employee of a corporation commits a tort during the course of the employee's employment, the employer is usually going to be liable for that.

So if you had -- if, if you have CACI employees over in Abu Ghraib who are committing these violations, why would that -- and under a theory of aiding and abetting or

conspiracy, because that's all we have left in this case, we have that type of sort of joint liability, if you want to put it that way, why would that not be enough?

MR. O'CONNOR: Because, because the claims are brought under ATS, and ATS, the Supreme Court has said three different times, has zero extraterritorial application, meaning that conduct occurring in Iraq is not actionable under ATS.

So the -- if the plaintiffs had sued Bill Jones, you know, contractor, or Sergeant Jones, military interrogator, and under ATS, because they had done bad things in Iraq, those claims would be dismissed under Nestlé because it's entirely extraterritorial, so therefore, their employers would not have agency or respondeat superior liability because there's no -- the person -- the alleged tortfeasor is, in fact, not a tortfeasor under the ATS.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. O'CONNOR: Now, if there had been a common law claim and that had been -- that had proceeded and -- then we would have a question about, you know, whether an employer -- whether that conduct is within the scope of employment, that somebody is out committing torture or slavery.

THE COURT: Of course, you know, the first argument that the plaintiffs are actually making is that this does not involve an extraterritorial application of the ATS because of the particular unique nature of the American presence in Iraq

at that time and the specific rules that have governed Abu

Ghraib.

MR. O'CONNOR: Well, we're aware of that, Your Honor, and I think we dealt with that, I think, well in our reply.

The Fifth Circuit certainly disagrees with that in Adhikari, where they considered an argument that Al Asad Air Base in Iraq was functionally United States for purposes of ATS, and the Court went through and said no, that's not right.

And the language in *Kiobel* and *Nestlé* talks about in the United States. Iraq is not in the United States, and Iraq was under the control of the CPA, which was a U.N.-authorized multination peacekeeping effort, but even if all that was not true and the U.S. had just invaded all by itself and had just occupied, it's still not in the United States.

And the reliance on Rasul is wrong because Rasul dealt with how do we construe this statute, and this Court said, well, we construe this statute as having extraterritorial application. They can apply to a person who's detained outside the United States as long as the custodian is subject to process here.

But we -- but we're not in a position of construing ATS as to whether it can have some extraterritorial application. The Supreme Court has said three different times that it doesn't.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

1 Mr. Nelson, or who is going to argue? 2 MR. AZMY: I don't know if there's any particular 3 order. 4 THE COURT: Why don't you start with the 5 extraterritorial issue first. That was the first argument you made and the last one I just heard. 6 7 MR. AZMY: I think it's logically antecedent to the 8 Nestlé question, and we strongly disagree with the defendant's 9 characterization of Rasul as applying the presumption. Rasul 10 is very clear to say the government argues that this 11 presumption should apply, but it has no application in a 12 context where the United States exercises jurisdiction and 13 control. Therefore, the territory is de facto U.S. territory. 14 The "in" is a construct that the Court says doesn't 15 turn on sovereignty, turns on de facto control. They cite 16 Vermilya and Foley Brothers, which are Fair Labor Standards Act cases that come to the same conclusion, and I'd really -- I'd 17 18 really commend Your Honor to look at Judge Ellis's decision in Souryal, which we cite. He does exactly the process we do 19 20 here. 21 The question was whether the FMLA applied to the U.S. 22 Embassy in Iraq as of 2009, and the first question he says we 23 have to ask is was this workplace U.S. territory, and he -- to 24 define "U.S. territory," he says was it under the 25 jurisdiction -- did the United States have jurisdiction to

- regulate conduct? He concludes the answer to that is no, it is not U.S. territory. It is therefore extraterritorial.
- Then he gets on the staircase of Step 1 and Step 2
- 4 and applies the presumption against extraterritoriality. But,
- of course, Iraq in 2005 is not Iraq in 2009 that he was
- 6 | considering, and the CPA was completely controlled by the
- 7 United States, answerable to the President in all the ways we
- 8 described.
- 9 THE COURT: Well, Mr. O'Connor has just said, though,
- 10 | that the United Nations was part of that structure.
- 11 MR. AZMY: It was. Two responses, Your Honor: The
- 12 United States had ultimate control and authority, and if you
- 13 look at these orders, they're displacing Iraqi law and
- 14 | replacing it with United States law in -- almost in totality,
- 15 and Bremer is in charge.
- Too, the same sort of argument was brought up in the
- 17 | Munaf v. Geren case. It's a bit of an obscure case, but the
- 18 | Court said the fact that there was international participation
- 19 | in the CPA doesn't change the analysis that the United States
- 20 was ultimately in control.
- 21 And it's, you know, it's a kind of sui generis
- 22 | situation for Rasul, for the air base in Bermuda, for the U.S.
- 23 | Embassy in Iraq, and here, and that -- you know, in response to
- 24 | their slippery slope argument, the slope has ended. There's
- 25 no -- there are no more cases that could be brought.

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And, you know, I think it's not just the principle of
fairly elementary justice. If a -- the United States chooses
to invade, occupy, and completely govern and displace Iraqi
law, it seems fair that U.S. actors should be subject to U.S.
law. It doesn't seem that radical, and I think that's the
notion that Rasul was getting at as a matter of fundamental
fairness.
          THE COURT: All right. And obviously, if the Court
were to find that there, in fact, was no extraterritorial issue
here, that really -- does that not pretty much moot the rest of
the issues?
          MR. AZMY: Yes, right. In the way that -- in the way
that Rasul concluded. We don't have to get to the analysis of
Step 1 and Step 2 if it's de facto U.S. territory.
          THE COURT: All right. But assume I don't find that.
          MR. AZMY: Yes.
          THE COURT: Then go on.
          MR. AZMY: Yeah, I mean, we quite agree that, that
CACI overreads Nestlé. They do say that the law changed
dramatically, which is what is required in order to abrogate
Al Shimari, but as the Fourth Circuit in Roe v. Howard said,
Nabisco doesn't overrule Kiobel and at Step 2 retains a
similar -- the focus part of Step 2 retains a similar interest
in domestic conduct.
          Further, as Your Honor pointed out, I think Kiobel,
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Nestlé, and Nabisco are in constant conversation with Kiobel and continue to ratify Kiobel in its application, and in a way, they're really two sides of the same test.

Kiobel asks is that -- do the activities touch and concern the United States with sufficient force and displace the presumption, and, you know, Nabisco and Nestlé ask -- sorry, Nestlé asks is -- do the cause of action -- does the cause of action, not the claim, the cause of action, similar term, have a sufficient connection to the United States to -- relevant conduct in the United States? So they're really both saying if, if there are sufficient connections to the United States, that's a permissible domestic application of the ATS, it seems.

And I, I want to stress sort of, zoom out a little bit and talk about just the really bare deficiencies of the allegations in <code>Nestlé</code> as compared to this case. In <code>Nestlé</code>, there was zero corporate presence in Côte d'Ivoire -- if I'm saying that correctly -- in terms of staff or operations.

The very -- one of the very first lines the Supreme Court says is they do not own or operate farms on the Ivory Coast. In that sense, it was the most generic corporate activity, just went there to buy cocoa and to give them fertilizer, and the only reason they were visiting was to do this general stream of commerce kind of activity.

There were no allegations that they were visiting to

supervise employees there. There were no allegations that they were visiting and were made aware, let alone as we have argued, ratified the idea that they were hiring child slaves from Mali.

THE COURT: The other fact that doesn't exist in any of those cases, that whole line of cases, is that the presence of the American corporation CACI in the foreign country is via a contract with the U.S. government, so, in essence, you have U.S. interests both domestically and in the foreign space.

All these other cases involved basically foreign corporations other than Nestlé, right, foreign corporations dealing with foreign governments or foreign entities.

MR. AZMY: Right.

THE COURT: But you didn't have this U.S.-to-U.S. connection that we have here.

MR. AZMY: Right. U.S. to U.S. where the contract specifically makes CACI responsible for supervising their employees, and that's not in Nestlé, and as we set out in page 25 of our brief in comparison to the Nestlé facts, they made the hiring, promotion, and termination decisions in Virginia for the very employees that engaged in the misconduct.

There's nothing like that in *Nestlé*. So there's a real connection between the domestic conduct and the perpetuation of the tort.

And certainly the idea that the tort has to occur in the United States is not the law. That's Justice Alito's

from the underlying tort is not enough.

position in *Kiobel* joined by Justice Thomas at the time, but,

of course, Justice Thomas now abandons that position in writing

for eight justices in *Nestlé* in this fairly generic, I think,

banal application of the ATS, where on the one hand, mere

corporate presence is not enough, on the other hand, mere

generic corporate activity of the kind here that's disconnected

THE COURT: The other thing that is missing, I think, in this case, again because what we're dealing here is U.S. to U.S., so to speak, is this concern that runs through all of these cases, and that is, the concern about interference with international relations with a sovereign state.

Again, because of the unique nature of Iraq at that time and the, the presence of the U.S. forces, that doesn't exist.

MR. AZMY: I think that's really, that's really present both in Rasul, where, you know, the Court basically says, well, if there's no U.S. law, there's no law, which is sort of problematic to the principle of rule of law, and it's apparent in Jesner and the other cases, where they continue to say we can't drag these foreign cases into the United States courts. They'll be upset. Go to Holland or sue in Nigeria.

Here there's no other place to sue. The CPA told -tells contractors they're immune from Iraqi law and you're
subject to the law of the parent state.

Well, here we are. We're subject to the law of the parent state, and there is no disjuncture there of the kind that the Supreme Court was worried about. I quite agree.

THE COURT: Well, this is, this is a unique case. I mean, the facts here, in my view, are quite different from the facts in that *Kiobel* line of cases.

At the same time, in reading those cases carefully, there certainly is some interest, it seems to me, among some of the justices to perhaps issue a ruling that basically would cut off all corporate liability for any conduct overseas, which is a potentially very troubling possibility.

And so I'm obviously going to take my time in looking at this issue. I'm not going to give you a ruling today. As I've said, you-all did a phenomenal job of writing very interesting and compelling briefs, but this is a really serious issue.

You know, in a society that's become so global, where our corporations are present all over the world, there are ramifications for cases like this that have to be considered very, very carefully, and so we're going to take some time on this, which is why I started the whole program today -- or the whole session today with talking to you-all about the realities of litigation.

As, as important and fascinating as these issues are, ultimately we're dealing with three human being plaintiffs and

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a corporation that's well known in this area, and I would think
that good attorneys for both sides ought to try to see whether
or not there is some way of working this out, and to the extent
that we can assist you in that respect by providing you with
access to one of our very good magistrate judges, we'll
certainly do that. And obviously, there are private mediation
services as well.
          I am going to look into -- so, Mr. O'Connor, be
prepared for this -- I'm going to look into the other case to
see where that's at because I think that might be helpful,
frankly, since I now that you mentioned it recall that that was
always sort of lingering in the background, and if that is some
sort of an obstacle to a realistic approach.
          Have you been in contact with counsel for the other
plaintiffs in any respect?
          MR. AZMY: I think it's been five years, Your Honor.
I too totally forgot about that case.
          THE COURT: Yeah.
          MR. AZMY: I think it's very, very embrionic, you
know, and we'd have -- of course, we'd entertain it. We'd have
some concerns about a global settlement concerning how much
farther we've gone in the litigation, but I'm assuming there
are ways to accommodate in a, in a settlement that different
positionality.
          THE COURT: All right. The other thing is because
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- 32 1 the political world has changed somewhat here, are the 2 obstacles to your clients being able to get visas still in 3 effect, or do you feel that that might have changed? 4 MR. AZMY: We are investigating that given the new 5 State Department. I think COVID is just really a problem. I don't think our clients are vaccinated, for example. So we 6 7 have a political world, and then we have this epidemiological 8 world. 9 THE COURT: Well, your client in Sweden most likely 10 could be vaccinated at this point. 11 MR. AZMY: He could be. I think there are 12 restrictions -- formal restrictions on his travel because he's 13 in a refugee process. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. AZMY: So he, I think, is not permitted to leave 16 Sweden. 17 THE COURT: All right, very good. 18 MR. AZMY: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: All right. Well, thank you for the 20 argument, and we'll be back in touch, I'm not going to give you 21 a time frame, but as soon as we can. MR. AZMY: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: It won't be as long as the Supreme Court
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- 24 took, all right?
- 25 All right, we'll recess court for the day.

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1	(Which were all the proceedings	
2	had at this time.)	
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4	CERTIFICATE OF THE REPORTER	
5	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of	
6	the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.	
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9	/s/ Anneliese J. Thomson	
10	Affileliese J. Hollison	
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