SFFA v. Harvard Dissents
SFFA v. Harvard Dissents
____ (2023) 1
——————
*JUSTICE JACKSON did not participate in the consideration or decision
of the case in No. 20–1199 and joins this opinion only as it applies to the
case in No. 21–707.
2 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
753, 781 (1985). The Bureau also provided land and fund-
ing to establish some of our Nation’s Historically Black Col-
leges and Universities (HBCUs). Ibid.; see also Brief for
HBCU Leaders et al. as Amici Curiae 13 (HBCU Brief ). In
1867, for example, the Bureau provided Howard University
tens of thousands of dollars to buy property and construct
its campus in our Nation’s capital. 2 O. Howard, Autobiog-
raphy 397–401 (1907). Howard University was designed to
provide “special opportunities for a higher education to the
newly enfranchised of the south,” but it was available to all
Black people, “whatever may have been their previous con-
dition.” Bureau Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned
Lands, Sixth Semi-Annual Report on Schools for Freedmen
60 (July 1, 1868).1 The Bureau also “expended a total of
$407,752.21 on black colleges, and only $3,000 on white col-
leges” from 1867 to 1870. Schnapper, 71 Va. L. Rev., at 798,
n. 149.
Indeed, contemporaries understood that the Freedmen’s
Bureau Act benefited Black people. Supporters defended
the law by stressing its race-conscious approach. See, e.g.,
Cong. Globe 632 (statement of Rep. Moulton) (“[T]he true
object of this bill is the amelioration of the condition of the
colored people”); Joint Comm. Rep. 11 (reporting that “the
Union men of the south” declared “with one voice” that the
Bureau’s efforts “protect[ed] the colored people”). Oppo-
nents argued that the Act created harmful racial classifica-
tions that favored Black people and disfavored white Amer-
icans. See, e.g., Cong. Globe 397 (statement of Sen. Willey)
(the Act makes “a distinction on account of color between
the two races”), 544 (statement of Rep. Taylor) (the Act is
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1 As JUSTICE THOMAS acknowledges, the HBCUs, including Howard
——————
2 By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by the States in
B
The Reconstruction era marked a transformational point
in the history of American democracy. Its vision of equal
opportunity leading to an equal society “was short-lived,”
however, “with the assistance of this Court.” Id., at 391. In
a series of decisions, the Court “sharply curtailed” the “sub-
stantive protections” of the Reconstruction Amendments
and the Civil Rights Acts. Id., at 391–392 (collecting cases).
That endeavor culminated with the Court’s shameful deci-
sion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896), which es-
tablished that “equality of treatment” exists “when the
races are provided substantially equal facilities, even
though these facilities be separate.” Brown, 347 U. S., at
488. Therefore, with this Court’s approval, government-
enforced segregation and its concomitant destruction of
equal opportunity became the constitutional norm and in-
fected every sector of our society, from bathrooms to mili-
tary units and, crucially, schools. See Bakke, 438 U. S., at
393–394 (opinion of Marshall, J.); see also generally R.
Rothstein, The Color of Law 17–176 (2017) (discussing var-
ious federal policies that promoted racial segregation).
In a powerful dissent, Justice Harlan explained in Plessy
that the Louisiana law at issue, which authorized segrega-
tion in railway carriages, perpetuated a “caste” system. 163
U. S., at 559–560. Although the State argued that the law
“prescribe[d] a rule applicable alike to white and colored cit-
izens,” all knew that the law’s purpose was not “to exclude
white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks,” but
“to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or as-
signed to white persons.” Id., at 557. That is, the law “pro-
ceed[ed] on the ground that colored citizens are so inferior
and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public
coaches occupied by white citizens.” Id., at 560. Although
“[t]he white race deems itself to be the dominant race . . . in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in
power,” Justice Harlan explained, there is “no superior,
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 11
1
After more than a century of government policies enforc-
ing racial segregation by law, society remains highly segre-
gated. About half of all Latino and Black students attend a
racially homogeneous school with at least 75% minority stu-
dent enrollment.4 The share of intensely segregated minor-
ity schools (i.e., schools that enroll 90% to 100% racial mi-
norities) has sharply increased.5 To this day, the U. S.
Department of Justice continues to enter into desegregation
decrees with schools that have failed to “eliminat[e] the ves-
tiges of de jure segregation.” 6
Moreover, underrepresented minority students are
more likely to live in poverty and attend schools with a
high concentration of poverty.7 When combined with resi-
dential segregation and school funding systems that rely
heavily on local property taxes, this leads to racial minority
students attending schools with fewer resources. See San
Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1,
72–86 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting school fund-
ing disparities that result from local property taxation).8 In
——————
4 See GAO, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Education and La-
July 5, 2022), ECF Doc. 199, p. 19; id., at 6 (requiring school district to
ensure “the participation of black students” in advanced courses).
7 GAO Report 6, 13 (noting that 80% of predominantly Black and La-
tino schools have at least 75% of their students eligible for free or
reduced-price lunch—a proxy for poverty).
8 See also L. Clark, Barbed Wire Fences: The Structural Violence of
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School Funding: How Housing Discrimination Reproduces Unequal Op-
portunity 17–19 (Apr. 2022).
9 See Brief for 25 Harvard Student and Alumni Organizations as Amici
——————
Developmental Psychology 11 (2016); A. Kenly & A. Klein, Early Child-
hood Experiences of Black Children in a Diverse Midwestern Suburb, 24
J. African American Studies 130, 136 (2020).
14 Dept. of Education, National Center for Education, Institute of Edu-
ble 622) (noting Black and Latino adults are more likely to be unem-
ployed).
16 Id., at 173 (Table 259).
17 A. McCargo & J. Choi, Closing the Gaps: Building Black Wealth
the United States: 2021, p. 9 (fig. 5); id., at 29 (Table C–1), https://www.
census.gov/library/publications/2022/demo/p60-278.html (noting racial
minorities, particularly Latinos, are less likely to have health insurance
coverage).
22 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
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19 In 1979, prompted by lawsuits filed by civil rights lawyers under Ti-
guides the Court’s review under Title VI, as the majority correctly recog-
nizes. See ante, at 6, n. 2; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U. S. 265, 325 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). JUSTICE GORSUCH argues
that “Title VI bears independent force” and holds universities to an even
higher standard than the Equal Protection Clause. Ante, at 25. Because
no party advances JUSTICE GORSUCH’s argument, see ante, at 6, n. 2, the
Court properly declines to address it under basic principles of party
presentation. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. ___, ___
(2020) (slip op., at 3). Indeed, JUSTICE GORSUCH’s approach calls for even
more judicial restraint. If petitioner could prevail under JUSTICE
GORSUCH’s statutory analysis, there would be no reason for this Court to
reach the constitutional question. See Escambia County v. McMillan,
466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam). In a statutory case, moreover, stare
decisis carries “enhanced force,” as it would be up to Congress to “correct
any mistake it sees” with “our interpretive decisions.” Kimble v. Marvel
Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015). JUSTICE
GORSUCH wonders why the dissent, like the majority, does not “engage”
with his statutory arguments. Ante, at 16. The answer is simple: This
Court plays “the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.”
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U. S. 237, 243 (2008). Petitioner made a
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 27
A
Answering the question whether Harvard’s and UNC’s
policies survive strict scrutiny under settled law is straight-
forward, both because of the procedural posture of these
cases and because of the narrow scope of the issues pre-
sented by petitioner Students for Fair Admissions, Inc.
(SFFA).22
These cases arrived at this Court after two lengthy trials.
Harvard and UNC introduced dozens of fact witnesses, ex-
pert testimony, and documentary evidence in support of
their admissions programs. Brief for Petitioner 20, 40.
SFFA, by contrast, did not introduce a single fact witness
and relied on the testimony of two experts. Ibid.
After making detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the District Courts entered judgment in favor of Har-
vard and UNC. See 397 F. Supp. 3d 126, 133–206 (Mass.
2019) (Harvard I ); 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, 588–667 (MDNC
2021) (UNC). The First Circuit affirmed in the Harvard
case, finding “no error” in the District Court’s thorough
opinion. 980 F. 3d 157, 204 (2020) (Harvard II ). SFFA then
filed petitions for a writ of certiorari in both cases, which
the Court granted. 595 U. S. ___ (2022).23
The Court granted certiorari on three questions: (1)
whether the Court should overrule Bakke, Grutter, and
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strategic litigation choice, and in our adversarial system, it is not up to
this Court to come up with “wrongs to right” on behalf of litigants. Id., at
244 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 SFFA is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization founded after this Court’s
decision in Fisher I, 570 U. S. 297 (2013). App. to Pet. for Cert. in No.
20–1199, p. 10. Its original board of directors had three self-appointed
members: Edward Blum, Abigail Fisher (the plaintiff in Fisher), and
Richard Fisher. See ibid.
23 Bypassing the Fourth Circuit’s opportunity to review the District
Court’s opinion in the UNC case, SFFA sought certiorari before judg-
ment, urging that, “[p]aired with Harvard,” the UNC case would “allow
the Court to resolve the ongoing validity of race-based admissions under
both Title VI and the Constitution.” Pet. for Cert. in No. 21–707, p. 27.
28 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
of the graduating high school students with the highest academic cre-
dentials. See, e.g., Fisher II, 579 U. S., at 373 (describing the University
of Texas’ Top Ten Percent Plan).
25 SFFA and JUSTICE GORSUCH reach beyond the factfinding below and
argue that universities in States that have banned the use of race in col-
lege admissions have achieved racial diversity through efforts such as
increasing socioeconomic preferences, so UNC could do the same. Brief
for Petitioner 85–86; ante, at 14. Data from those States disprove that
theory. Institutions in those States experienced “ ‘an immediate and pre-
cipitous decline in the rates at which underrepresented-minority stu-
dents applied . . . were admitted . . . and enrolled.’ ” Schuette v. BAMN,
30 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
2
Harvard’s admissions program is also narrowly tailored
under settled law. SFFA argues that Harvard’s program is
not narrowly tailored because the university “has workable
race-neutral alternatives,” “does not use race as a mere
plus,” and “engages in racial balancing.” Brief for Peti-
tioner 75–83. As the First Circuit concluded, there was “no
error” in the District Court’s findings on any of these issues.
Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at 204.26
Like UNC, Harvard has already implemented many of
SFFA’s proposals, such as increasing recruitment efforts
and financial aid for low-income students. Id., at 193. Also
like UNC, Harvard “carefully considered” other race-neutral
ways to achieve its diversity goals, but none of them are
“workable.” Id., at 193–194. SFFA’s argument before this
Court is that Harvard should adopt a plan designed by
SFFA’s expert for purposes of trial, which increases prefer-
ences for low-income applicants and eliminates the use of
race and legacy preferences. Id., at 193; Brief for Petitioner
——————
572 U. S. 291, 384–390 (2014) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting); see infra, at
63–64. In addition, UNC “already engages” in race-neutral efforts fo-
cused on socioeconomic status, including providing “exceptional levels of
financial aid” and “increased and targeted recruiting.” UNC, 567
F. Supp. 3d, at 665.
JUSTICE GORSUCH argues that he is simply “recount[ing] what SFFA
has argued.” Ante, at 14, n. 4. That is precisely the point: SFFA’s argu-
ments were not credited by the court below. “[W]e are a court of review,
not of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005).
JUSTICE GORSUCH also suggests it is inappropriate for the dissent to re-
spond to the majority by relying on materials beyond the findings of fact
below. Ante, at 14, n. 4. There would be no need for the dissent to do
that if the majority stuck to reviewing the District Court’s careful fact-
finding with the deference it owes to the trial court. Because the majority
has made a different choice, the dissent responds.
26 SFFA also argues that Harvard discriminates against Asian Ameri-
can students. Brief for Petitioner 72–75. As explained below, this claim
does not fit under Grutter’s strict scrutiny framework, and the courts be-
low did not err in rejecting that claim. See infra, at 59–60.
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 31
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27 JUSTICE GORSUCH suggests that only “applicants of certain races may
truncated period, ignoring the broader context of that data and what the
data reflect. Instead, the majority insists that its selected data prove
that Harvard’s “precise racial preferences” “operate like clockwork.”
Ante, at 31–32, n. 7. The Court’s conclusion that such racial preferences
must be responsible for an “unyielding demographic composition of [the]
36 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
III
The Court concludes that Harvard’s and UNC’s policies
are unconstitutional because they serve objectives that are
insufficiently measurable, employ racial categories that are
imprecise and overbroad, rely on racial stereotypes and
disadvantage nonminority groups, and do not have an end
point. Ante, at 21–34, 39. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court claims those supposed issues with respondents’ pro-
grams render the programs insufficiently “narrow” under
the strict scrutiny framework that the Court’s precedents
command. Ante, at 22. In reality, however, “the Court to-
day cuts through the kudzu” and overrules its “higher-
education precedents” following Bakke. Ante, at 22
(GORSUCH, J., concurring).
There is no better evidence that the Court is overruling
the Court’s precedents than those precedents themselves.
“Every one of the arguments made by the majority can be
found in the dissenting opinions filed in [the] cases” the ma-
jority now overrules. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 846
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Grutter, 539
U. S., at 354 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“Unlike the majority, I seek to define with preci-
sion the interest being asserted”); Fisher II, 579 U. S., at
389 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (race-conscious admissions
——————
class,” ibid., misunderstands basic principles of statistics. A number of
factors (most notably, the demographic composition of the applicant pool)
affect the demographic composition of the entering class. Assume, for
example, that Harvard admitted students based solely on standardized
test scores. If test scores followed a normal distribution (even with dif-
ferent averages by race) and were relatively constant over time, and if
the racial shares of total applicants were also relatively constant over
time, one would expect the same “unyielding demographic composition
of [the] class.” Ibid. That would be true even though, under that hypo-
thetical scenario, Harvard does not consider race in admissions at all. In
other words, the Court’s inference that precise racial preferences must
be the cause of relatively constant racial shares of admitted students is
specious.
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 37
ity,” the Court has adhered to a strict scrutiny framework despite multi-
ple Members of this Court urging that “the mandate of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause” favors applying a less exacting standard of review. Schuette,
572 U. S., at 373–374 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 39
ery and Jim Crow continue today, citing Justice Marshall’s opinion in
Bakke. Ante, at 7 (citing 438 U. S., at 395–402). As explained above,
Justice Marshall’s view was that Bakke covered only a portion of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s sweeping reach, such that the Court’s higher
education precedents must be expanded, not constricted. See 438 U. S.,
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 41
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at 395–402 (opinion dissenting in part). Justice Marshall’s reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not support JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’S and
the majority’s opinions.
42 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
has approved” many times in the past. Fisher II, 579 U. S.,
at 382; see, e.g., UNC, 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 598 (“the [univer-
sity’s admissions policy] repeatedly cites Supreme Court
precedent as guideposts”).33 At bottom, without any new
factual or legal justification, the Court overrides its
longstanding holding that diversity in higher education is
of compelling value.
To avoid public accountability for its choice, the Court
seeks cover behind a unique measurability requirement of
its own creation. None of this Court’s precedents, however,
requires that a compelling interest meet some threshold
level of precision to be deemed sufficiently compelling. In
fact, this Court has recognized as compelling plenty of in-
terests that are equally or more amorphous, including the
“intangible” interest in preserving “public confidence in ju-
dicial integrity,” an interest that “does not easily reduce to
precise definition.” Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575
U. S. 433, 447, 454 (2015) (ROBERTS, C. J., for the Court);
see also, e.g., Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022)
(ROBERTS, C. J., for the Court) (slip op., at 18) (“[M]aintain-
ing solemnity and decorum in the execution chamber” is a
“compelling” interest); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S.
709, 725 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“[P]rotecting the integ-
rity of the Medal of Honor” is a “compelling interes[t]”); Sa-
ble Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126
(1989) (“[P]rotecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors” is a “compelling interest”). Thus, although
——————
33 There is no dispute that respondents’ compelling diversity objectives
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36 The Court suggests that the term “Asian American” was developed
——————
37 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’s reading, in particular, is quite puzzling. Un-
of race in connection with the personal rating. Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at
169. Harvard later modified its instructions to say explicitly that “ ‘an
applicant’s race or ethnicity should not be considered in assigning the
personal rating.’ ” Ibid.
60 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
rate as other applicants and now make up more than 20% of Harvard’s
admitted classes,” even though “only about 6% of the United States pop-
ulation is Asian American.” Harvard I, 397 F. Supp. 3d, at 203.
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 61
motivated Dred Scott and Plessy” are the ones who support
race conscious admissions. Ante, at 39. The plethora of
young students of color who testified in favor of race-
consciousness proves otherwise. See supra, at 46–47; see
also infra, at 64–67 (discussing numerous amici from many
sectors of society supporting respondents’ policies). Not a
single student—let alone any racial minority—affected by
the Court’s decision testified in favor of SFFA in these
cases.
C
In its “radical claim to power,” the Court does not even
acknowledge the important reliance interests that this
Court’s precedents have generated. Dobbs, 597 U. S., at ___
(dissenting opinion) (slip op., at 53). Significant rights and
expectations will be affected by today’s decision nonethe-
less. Those interests supply “added force” in favor of stare
decisis. Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm’n,
502 U. S. 197, 202 (1991).
Students of all backgrounds have formed settled expecta-
tions that universities with race-conscious policies “will
provide diverse, cross-cultural experiences that will better
prepare them to excel in our increasingly diverse world.”
Brief for Respondent-Students in No. 21–707, at 45; see
Harvard College Brief 6–11 (collecting student testimony).
Respondents and other colleges and universities with
race-conscious admissions programs similarly have con-
crete reliance interests because they have spent significant
resources in an effort to comply with this Court’s prece-
dents. “Universities have designed courses that draw on
the benefits of a diverse student body,” “hired faculty whose
research is enriched by the diversity of the student body,”
and “promoted their learning environments to prospective
students who have enrolled based on the understanding
that they could obtain the benefits of diversity of all kinds.”
Brief for Respondent in No. 20–1199, at 40–41 (internal
62 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
See J. Fogel, M. Hoopes, & G. Liu, Law Clerk Selection and Diversity:
Insights From Fifty Sitting Judges of the Federal Courts of Appeals 7–8
68 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
——————
*JUSTICE JACKSON did not participate in the consideration or decision
of the case in No. 20–1199, and issues this opinion with respect to the
case in No. 21–707.
2 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting
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1 M. Oliver & T. Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspec-
tive on Racial Inequality 128 (1997) (Oliver & Shapiro) (emphasis de-
leted).
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
I
A
Imagine two college applicants from North Carolina,
John and James. Both trace their family’s North Carolina
roots to the year of UNC’s founding in 1789. Both love their
State and want great things for its people. Both want to
honor their family’s legacy by attending the State’s flagship
educational institution. John, however, would be the sev-
enth generation to graduate from UNC. He is White.
James would be the first; he is Black. Does the race of these
applicants properly play a role in UNC’s holistic merits-
based admissions process?
To answer that question, “a page of history is worth a vol-
ume of logic.” New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345,
349 (1921). Many chapters of America’s history appear nec-
essary, given the opinions that my colleagues in the major-
ity have issued in this case.
Justice Thurgood Marshall recounted the genesis:
“Three hundred and fifty years ago, the Negro was
dragged to this country in chains to be sold into slavery.
Uprooted from his homeland and thrust into bondage
for forced labor, the slave was deprived of all legal
rights. It was unlawful to teach him to read; he could
be sold away from his family and friends at the whim
of his master; and killing or maiming him was not a
crime. The system of slavery brutalized and dehuman-
ized both master and slave.” Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 387–388 (1978).
Slavery should have been (and was to many) self-
evidently dissonant with our avowed founding principles.
When the time came to resolve that dissonance, eleven
States chose slavery. With the Union’s survival at stake,
Frederick Douglass noted, Black Americans in the South
“were almost the only reliable friends the nation had,” and
“but for their help . . . the Rebels might have succeeded in
4 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting
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2 An Appeal to Congress for Impartial Suffrage, Atlantic Monthly (Jan.
Amendment and the Bill of Rights 48, 71–75, 91, 173 (1986).
5 Message Accompanying Veto of the Civil Rights Bill (Mar. 27, 1866),
in Lash 145.
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
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13 R. Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Gov-
421, 424 (1960); Foner 47–48; Du Bois 179, 696; Baradaran 38–39.
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 7
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19 T. Shanks, The Homestead Act: A Major Asset-Building Policy in
——————
26 D. Massey & N. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the
Bright Light on the Color of Wealth, 120 Mich. L. Rev. 1085, 1100 (2022)
(Dickerson).
40 Katznelson 53; see id., at 22, 29, 42–48, 53–61; Rothstein 31, 155–
156.
10 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting
140 (Black veterans, North and South, were routinely denied loans that
White veterans received); Rothstein 167.
42 Baradaran 112–113.
43 Katznelson 22–23; Rothstein 167.
44 Id., at 54–56, 65, 127–131, 217; Stanford Institute for Economic Pol-
B
History speaks. In some form, it can be heard forever.
The race-based gaps that first developed centuries ago are
echoes from the past that still exist today. By all accounts,
they are still stark.
Start with wealth and income. Just four years ago, in
2019, Black families’ median wealth was approximately
$24,000.46 For White families, that number was approxi-
mately eight times as much (about $188,000).47 These
wealth disparities “exis[t] at every income and education
level,” so, “[o]n average, white families with college degrees
have over $300,000 more wealth than black families with
college degrees.”48 This disparity has also accelerated over
time—from a roughly $40,000 gap between White and
Black household median net worth in 1993 to a roughly
$135,000 gap in 2019.49 Median income numbers from 2019
tell the same story: $76,057 for White households, $98,174
for Asian households, $56,113 for Latino households, and
$45,438 for Black households.50
These financial gaps are unsurprising in light of the link
——————
46 Dickerson 1086 (citing data from 2019 Federal Reserve Survey of
——————
51 Id., at 87; Wealth of Two Nations 77–79.
52 Id., at 78, 89; Bollinger & Stone 94–95; Dickerson 1101.
53 Bollinger & Stone 99–100.
54 Id., at 99, and n. 58.
55 Dickerson 1088; Bollinger & Stone 100, and n. 63.
56 ABA, Profile of the Legal Profession 33 (2020).
57 Bollinger & Stone 106; Brief for HR Policy Association as Amicus
Curiae 18–19.
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 13
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58 Dickerson 1102.
59 Rothstein 230.
60 Brief for Association of American Medical Colleges et al. as Amici
Among the Black Population in the U. S., 1999–2020, 329 JAMA 1662,
1663, 1667 (May 16, 2023) (Caraballo).
62 Bollinger & Stone 101.
63 S. Whetstone et al., Health Disparities in Uterine Cancer: Report
From the Uterine Cancer Evidence Review Conference, 139 Obstetrics &
Gynecology 645, 647–648 (2022).
64 AMC Brief 8–9.
65 Bollinger & Stone 101; Caraballo 1663–1665, 1668.
66 Bollinger & Stone 101 (footnotes omitted).
14 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting
v. Gingles, in Election Law Stories 133–139 (J. Douglas & E. Mazo eds.
2016); see Foner xxii.
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 15
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73 3 App. 1683.
74 Id., at 1687–1688.
75 See O. James, Valuing Identity, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 127, 162 (2017);
——————
76 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, 595 (MDNC 2021).
77 Id., at 596; 1 App. 348; Decl. of J. Rosenberg in No. 1:14–cv–954
race could “b[e] a potential plus” for “students other than underrepre-
sented minority students,” pointing to a North Carolinian applicant,
originally from Vietnam, who identified as “Asian and Montagnard”); id.,
at 639 (Farmer stating that “the whole of [that student’s] background
was appealing to us when we evaluated her applicatio[n],” and noting
how her “story reveals sometimes how hard it is to separate race out from
other things that we know about a student. That was integral to that
student’s story. It was part of our understanding of her, and it played a
role in our deciding to admit her”).
84 3 id., at 1416; Rosenberg ¶25.
85 2 App. 631.
86 Id., at 636–637, 713.
87 3 id., at 1416; 2 id., at 699–700.
88 Id., at 699; see also Rosenberg ¶24.
18 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting
——————
89 2 App. 706, 708; 3 id., at 1415–1416.
90 2 id., at 706, 708; 3 id., at 1415–1416.
91 A reader might miss this because the majority does not bother to
cannot deny this factual finding. Instead, it conducts its own back-of-
the-envelope calculations (its numbers appear nowhere in the District
Court’s opinion) regarding “the overall acceptance rates of academically
excellent applicants to UNC,” in an effort to trivialize the District Court’s
conclusion. Ante, at 5, n. 1. I am inclined to stick with the District
Court’s findings over the majority’s unauthenticated calculations. Even
when the majority’s ad hoc statistical analysis is taken at face value, it
hardly supports what the majority wishes to intimate: that Black stu-
dents are being admitted based on UNC’s myopic focus on “race—and
race alone.” Ante, at 28, n. 6. As the District Court observed, if these
Black students “were largely defined in the admissions process by their
race, one would expect to find that every” such student “demonstrating
academic excellence . . . would be admitted.” 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 619 (em-
phasis added). Contrary to the majority’s narrative, “race does not even
act as a tipping point for some students with otherwise exceptional qual-
ifications.” Ibid. Moreover, as the District Court also found, UNC does
not even use the bespoke “academic excellence” metric that SFFA’s ex-
pert “ ‘invented’ ” for this litigation. Id., at 617, 619; see also id., at 624–
625. The majority’s calculations of overall acceptance rates by race on
that metric bear scant relationship to, and thus are no indictment of, how
UNC’s admissions process actually works (a recurring theme in its opin-
ion).
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 21
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95 See Bollinger & Stone 86, 103.
22 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting
——————
98 AMC Brief 4, 14; see also Brief for American Federation of Teachers
(same); Brief for National School Boards Association et al. as Amici Cu-
riae 6–11 (same); see also 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 592–593, 655–656 (factual
findings in this case with respect to these benefits).
102 LaVeist et al., The Economic Burden of Racial, Ethnic, and Educa-
tional Health Inequities in the U. S., 329 JAMA 1682, 1683–1684, 1689,
1691 (May 16, 2023).
24 STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
JACKSON, J., dissenting
——————
103 JUSTICE THOMAS’s prolonged attack, ante, at 49–55 (concurring opin-
——————
ment,” ante, at 51. JUSTICE THOMAS’s opinion also demonstrates an ob-
session with race consciousness that far outstrips my or UNC’s holistic
understanding that race can be a factor that affects applicants’ unique
life experiences. How else can one explain his detection of “an organizing
principle based on race,” a claim that our society is “fundamentally rac-
ist,” and a desire for Black “victimhood” or racial “silo[s],” ante, at 49–52,
in this dissent’s approval of an admissions program that advances all
Americans’ shared pursuit of true equality by treating race “on par with”
other aspects of identity, supra, at 18? JUSTICE THOMAS ignites too many
more straw men to list, or fully extinguish, here. The takeaway is that
those who demand that no one think about race (a classic pink-elephant
paradox) refuse to see, much less solve for, the elephant in the room—
the race-linked disparities that continue to impede achievement of our
great Nation’s full potential. Worse still, by insisting that obvious truths
be ignored, they prevent our problem-solving institutions from directly
addressing the real import and impact of “social racism” and
“government-imposed racism,” ante, at 55 (THOMAS, J., concurring),
thereby deterring our collective progression toward becoming a society
where race no longer matters.
Cite as: 600 U. S. ____ (2023) 27
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potential consequences of the [majority’s] approach, as measured against
the Constitution’s objectives . . . provides further reason to believe that
the [majority’s] approach is legally unsound.” Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 858 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). I fear that the Court’s folly brings our Nation to
the brink of coming “full circle” once again. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 402 (1978) (opinion of Marshall, J.).
106 Compare ante, at 22, n. 4, with ante, at 22–30, and supra, at 3–4,